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Kim Forde-Mazrui 52 Vand. L. Rev. 353 (1999)
Court reformers continue to debate over efforts to select juries more diverse
than are typically achieved through existing procedures. Controversial proposals
advocate race-conscious methods for selecting diverse juries. Such efforts, however
well-intentioned, face constitutional difficulties under the Equal Protection Clause,
which appears to preclude any use of race in selecting juries. The challenge thus
presented by the Court's equal protection jurisprudence is whether jury selection
procedures can be designed that effectively enhance the representative character of
juries without violating constitutional norms.
Professor Forde-Mazrui offers a novel insight for resolving this challenge.
Analogizing juries to legislatures, he applies electoral districting principles to jury
selection. Striking parallels between legislatures and juries justify comparing the
selection of jurors to the election of legislators. Both legislatures and juries are
fundamental institutions that best serve their function when their membership is
representative of their respective jurisdiction. The electoral process enhances the
representative character of legislatures through single-member districting.
Although limiting the use of race in drawing electoral districts, the Court has
endorsed designing districts around "communities of interest," communities with
shared political interests identified geographically by demographic characteristics
such as residential proximity, socioeconomic class, occupation, religion, and politi-
cal affiliation. Curiously, the Court even permits some use of race in drawing
districts provided it is only one among many factors.
Drawing on electoral districting experience and doctrine, Professor Forde-
Mazrui proposes a jury selection procedure he terms 'Yural districting." An
implementing jurisdiction would divide a jury district into twelve sub-districts,
designed around "communities of interest," and would require juries to contain
jurors from every sub-district. Such a procedure should satisfy constitutional
objections and, moreover, would create broadly diverse juries representing a
variety of communities, including communities identifiable by race, ethnicity,
religion, political affiliation, and socioeconomic status. Jural districting would
thereby create juries more broadly representative than juries selected by current
procedures or even by proposals relying predominantly on race. By improving the
quality ofjury decision-making through deliberation and consensus among a cross
section of groups, jural districting would thereby restore a substantial measure of
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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans have long been ambivalent toward the criminal
jury. In its favor, the right to trial by jury is deemed "fundamental to
the American scheme of justice,"' and is enshrined in the
Constitution's Sixth Amendment. 2 The primary purpose of the jury,
according to the Supreme Court, is to guard against arbitrary gov-
ernment power by interposing the judgment of ordinary citizens be-
tween the defendant and the potentially arbitrary or overzealous
prosecutor or judge.3 Despite its crucial role, the jury is criticized as
being inefficient, incompetent, confused, biased, and discriminatory.
4
A continuing challenge is to design a jury system that minimizes the
risk of determinable error while enhancing its legitimacy over poten-
tial alternative institutions of criminal justice.
This Article focuses on the criminal jury5 as a representative
6
institution. The persistent failure of juries to adequately represent
1. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
2. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,530 (1975).
4. See JEROME FRAN, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
110-14, 123-24 (1949) (discussing jury confusion with trial court instructions and complexity of
issues); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 212 (1989) (concluding that
inexplicable acquittals result because juries choose to be merciful rather than just or because
they misunderstand the court's instructions); Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification,
82 VA. L. REv. 253, 261, 279-80 (1996) (observing that juries sometimes misunderstand or
misapply the law, experience confusion, reach verdicts tainted by prejudice and passion, or
agree to compromise verdicts); Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law
of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771, 777-86 (1998) (identifying mistake, confusion,
compromise, and lenity as explanations for inconsistent verdicts within the same proceeding,
such as multiple-count inconsistencies and multiple defendant inconsistencies, that seem to defy
court instructions); Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury:
Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441,489-500 (1997) (discussing
common criticisms of juries, including jury confusion, incompetence, prejudice, unpredictability,
and cost).
5. This Article focuses on procedures for selecting the criminal petit jury, i.e., the jury of
traditionally twelve persons that observes a criminal trial and renders a verdict at its conclu-
sion. This should not imply that concerns addressed by this Article over the extent to which
juries can or should include members from diverse backgrounds do not apply to petit juries that
sit in civil cases or to grand juries that issue criminal indictments. To the contrary, much and
perhaps all of the discussion concerning the role of jury composition applies to these other juries
and, indeed, much of the doctrine and scholarly commentary does not distinguish between them.
I have limited the scope of my analysis principally to the criminal petit jury simply because of
the greater precision, clarity, and completeness of analysis afforded by a more particularized
focus. Moreover, among the various kinds of juries on which to focus, questions of fairness
about the criminal petit jury raise the gravest concerns given its responsibility for determining
guilt or innocence, freedom or incarceration, and life or death.
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various groups, particularly racial minorities, within a jurisdiction,
and the apparently unjust verdicts that have been rendered by such
underrepresentative juries, have brought the legitimacy of the jury
under increasing suspicion.7 This concern is not new. Historically,
juries have often failed to fairly represent minority groups residing
within a community for a variety of reasons, including the intentional
exclusion of group members from jury service.8 Recent high-profile
cases, such as the criminal trials of O.J. Simpson and the police offi-
cers who beat Rodney King, have greatly increased public awareness
of this problem of underrepresentative juries and precipitated a crisis
of confidence in the jury system.9
6. What I mean by jury representation or representativeness cannot be adequately defined
at this point as that concept lies at the heart of this Article's inquiry. However, I do not mean
only racial representation or, narrower still, representation of racial minorities. Because the
underrepresentation of racial minorities continues to be the most visible and troublesome way
in which juries fail to be representative, much of the literature on jury selection (including this
Article) focuses on the underrepresentation of such minorities. In general, however, by repre-
sentative juries, I mean juries that represent a broad range of different groups within a juris-
diction including, but not limited to, racial minorities, racial majorities, and groups defined by
traits other than race such as economic class, sex, religion, ethnicity, culture, age, occupation,
and political affiliation. Ultimately, I will explore the concept of juries that represent
"communities of interest" as that concept is understood in the context of electoral districting.
See infra Parts HI.C. and W.A.
7. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT
TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 32 (1977) (noting that underrepresentation of minorities on juries
contributes to mistrust of the criminal system by minorities); Albert W. Alschuler, Racial
Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 705-07, 734 (1995) (describing the negative reactions of
racial and nonracial groups to verdicts reached by juries that are not representative of their
interests).
8. Blacks were excluded from jury service by law in most states prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Supreme Court's invalidation of such practices in Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (stating that "the statute of West Virginia, discriminating in
the selection of jurors, as it does, against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of
the equal protection of the laws to a colored man. . . ."). See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:
THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
38 (Vintage Books 1977) (1976) (describing exclusion of African-Americans from jury service
during the 19th century). Since then and continuing to this day, blacks and other racial minori-
ties are underrepresented on juries due to a variety of race-neutral factors and due to inten-
tional, though covert, use of the peremptory challenge to exclude racial minorities on the basis
of race. See infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
9. Concerned with the erosion of public confidence in the jury system after recent
infamous cases, Professor George Fisher observes:
[We perhaps need not yet worry that the system is coming face-to-face with a future in
which jury verdicts, far from settling the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence
in the public mind, become for many an object of scorn.
And yet, there have been several such cases in just the last few years. Many of
those who watched the first Rodney King trial, the first Menendez brothers trial, and
the O.J. Simpson trial concluded that the jury was wrong. Perhaps they lost some of
their former faith in jury verdicts. Perhaps, then, the reformers are right-we really
should abolish trial by jury ....
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Although racially explicit barriers to minority participation in
jury service have been pulled down, many factors continue to dispro-
portionately exclude minorities from jury selection and service.10
Courts commonly generate lists of potential jurors from voter regis-
tration records-a database that tends to underrepresent the minority
population residing in a jury district." Also, because racial minorities
are statistically more mobile than whites, a greater number fail to re-
ceive jury summonses mailed to outdated addresses.12 Even when
they are contacted, minority residents are less likely to complete a
jury questionnaire or to respond to a jury summons due to apathy or
resentment toward a criminal justice system from which many feel al-
ienated. 13 Moreover, members of racial or ethnic minorities are more
likely to be disqualified from service for reasons such as lack of
English proficiency or having a criminal record. Minority jurors are
more likely to be excused from jury service due to financial hardship,
transportation difficulties, or child care responsibilities. 4 Finally,
prosecutors exercising peremptory challenges for ostensibly race-neu-
tral reasons disproportionately target racial minorities. 5 The net re-
sult is "that in many communities across the country, the percentage
of minority veniremembers, trial and grand jurors, and grand jury
forepersons is significantly lower than the percentage of minority
adults living in the communities from which they are drawn."16
Responding to the deepening delegitimization of the jury sys-
tem, court reformers and scholars have advanced proposals to achieve
George Fisher, The O.J. Simpson Corpus, 49 STAN. L. REV. 971, 1018-19 (1997); see also Laura
A. Giantris, The Maryland Survey: 1994-1995, The Necessity of Inquiry into Racial Bias in Voir
Dire, 55 MD. L. REV. 615, 615 (1996) (noting growing concern over racially biased juries follow-
ing the trials of O.J. Simpson and the officers who beat Rodney King); Lisa Kern Griffin, "The
Image We See Is Our Own": Defending the Jury's Territory at the Heart of the Democratic
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 332, 333 (1996) (stating that "[s]ensational stories, like the Simpson,
King, and Menendez trials, undermine the legitimacy of jury verdicts and call into question the
compatibility of the institution with the ideal of the rule of law").
10. For an overview of race-neutral selection procedures that result in the underrepresen-
tation of racial minorities, see Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A
Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 712-19
(1993).
11. See id. at 712-13; see also HIROSHI FuKuRAi ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL
DISENFRANCHISEMEITAND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 18 (1993).
12. See King, supra note 10, at 714; see also FUKURAI ET AL., supra note 11, at 21-26; VAN
DYKE, supra note 7, at 30.
13. See King, supra note 10, at 714.
14. See id. at 714-18.
15. Although evidence suggests that racial minorities are intentionally excluded on the
basis of race by peremptory challenges in disproportionate numbers, id. at 718 & n.33, trial
judges often find that such challenges were made for race-neutral reasons, see infra note 19.
16. King, supra note 10, at 719.
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greater representation of minority groups on juries. 7 Some reforms
alter the race-neutral procedures described above that tend to under-
select racial minorities. For example, some courts have turned to
additional sources for juror names to supplement voter registration
lists, such as driver's license records or tax rolls. Some courts have
also taken steps to enforce compliance with jury summonses and to
make jury service more convenient or remunerative.18 Courts also
continue, albeit with limited success, to police the racially discrimina-
tory use of the peremptory challenge. 19
These race-neutral reforms, while important, are necessarily
limited in their ability to ensure consistently diverse juries.20 Seeking
more immediate and effective ways to ensure jury diversity, many re-
formers have proposed selection procedures that would intentionally
use race as a selection criteria. 21 These more ambitious race-conscious
17. See generally Nancy J. King & G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror Selection:
Cross-Section by Design, 79 JUDICATURE 273 (1996) (reviewing a variety of race-neutral and
race-conscious measures for increasing diversity on juries).
18. See Munsterman & Munsterman, The Search for Representativeness, 11 JUST. SYS. J.
59 (1986), cited in King & Munsterman, supra note 17, at 274 n.3; King, supra note 10, at
752-56, 771-72.
19. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1830-31 (1993) (arguing that the types of
race-neutral explanations that are permitted to rebut a Batson challenge to a peremptory
challenge serve to conceal discrimination). Justice Thurgood Marshall warned that the only
way to prevent the purposeful use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors on account of race
was to eliminate peremptory challenges entirely. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03
(1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). For proposals to abolish the peremptory challenge, see Morris
B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U.
Cm. L. REV. 809 (1997); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the
Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REv 1041 (1995); Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge
is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination
from Jury Selection, 43 DEPAuL L. REv 625 (1994); Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case for
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227 (1986);
Robert M. O'Connell, Note, The Elimination of Racism from Jury Selection: Challenging the
Peremptory Challenge, 32 B.C. L. REV. 433 (1991).
20. For example, the time required to create master source lists of qualified jurors means
that some addresses will inevitably be outdated which, due to the greater mobility of racial
minorities, results in some minority underrepresentation. Additionally, court administrators
understandably resist abandoning reasonable qualification standards, such as English profi-
ciency and clean criminal records, which inadvertently exclude a greater percentage of minori-
ties. Moreover, overcoming minority suspicion and apathy toward the criminal justice system is
difficult and slow. See King & Munsterman, supra note 17, at 274. And short of abolishing the
peremptory challenge altogether, efforts to prevent racially-motivated challenges continue to
have limited success, see supra note 19.
21. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 7; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White
Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985); King, supra note 10; Diane Potash, Mandatory Inclusion of
Racial Minorities on Jury Panels, 3 BLACK L.J. 80 (1973); Deborah A. Ramirez, A Brief
Historical Overview of the Use of the Mixed Jury, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1213 (1994); Tracey L.
Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 781 (1986); Geoffrey Cockrell, Note, Batson Reform: A Lottery System of Affirmative
1999] 357
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"affirmative selection" procedures, however, face significant constitu-
tional difficulties. Recent Supreme Court cases interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause in the contexts of jury selection and affirma-
tive action programs suggest that most race-conscious jury selection
procedures would be subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny.22 These
cases seem to indicate that the Court would hold most race-conscious
jury selection procedures unconstitutional. While the Court's color-
blind stance is laudable in many respects, it threatens to undermine
good faith efforts to create representative juries.
This Article will address the challenge presented by the Court:
whether jury selection procedures can be designed to create represen-
tative juries more effectively and consistently than do current proce-
dures while satisfying equal protection concerns. The key insight this
Article proposes for resolving this puzzle is to draw on procedures and
doctrines of electoral districting, including the concept of
"communities of interest,"23 and to apply them to the selection of ju-
rors.
Part II of this Article examines the importance of the jury as a
representative institution and the difficulties inherent in efforts to
achieve this ideal. Part I.A considers the principal advantages of
representative juries-improved decision making, political legitimacy,
and civic education. Part II.B reviews recent reform proposals, fo-
cusing on race-conscious "affirmative selection" procedures, designed
to select more consistently representative juries, i.e., juries that in-
clude members from a broad cross-section of groups within a commu-
nity. Part II.C then examines constitutional doctrine concerning jury
selection and analyzes "affirmative selection" proposals under this
doctrine. This Part concludes that, although such procedures find
support in some Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment cases, more recent
Selection, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETICS & PUB. POLY 351 (1997); Harold A. McDougall, El, Note,
The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531 (1970); Donna J. Meyer, Note, A New Peremptory
Inclusion to Increase Representativeness and Impartiality in Jury Selection, 45 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 251 (1994). For an explanation of these proposals, see infra Part H.B.
22. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
23. "Communities of interest" refers to a concept developed by the Court in the context of
electoral districting. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). While the Court sometimes employs the term
"communities of interest," Hunt, 517 U.S. at 907; Miller, 515 U.S. at 919, it refers at other
points to "communities defined by actual shared interests" Miller, 515 U.S. at 916, and to com-
munities that have "some common thread of relevant interests," id. at 920. There does not
appear to be any meaningful difference between these terms. See Stephen J. Malone, Note,
Recognizing Communities of Interest in a Legislative Apportionment Plan, 83 VA. L. REV. 461




cases, particularly those brought under the Equal Protection Clause,
present serious and possibly fatal consequences for such proposals.
Part III turns to the legislative process. The representative
character of legislatures and juries justifies exploring whether proce-
dures used to elect legislatures provide useful insights for the selec-
tion of jurors. To enhance minority representation in the electoral
process, the federal government and many states have resorted to
electoral districting with the goal of creating majority-minority dis-
tricts. As in the jury context, however, the Court has substantially
limited the use of race as a factor in electoral districting. Despite
such limitations, and contrary to the popular press2 and some schol-
arly commentary,25 the Supreme Court has not banned race-conscious
electoral districting altogether. Instead, the Court permits legisla-
tures to consider race and other demographic factors to identify
"communities of interest"26 for inclusion within particular electoral
districts. Thus, unlike state action that defines groups primarily in
racial terms, which the Court deems impermissible stereotyping,
categorizing people by perceived "communities of interest" represents
a constitutionally permissible concept of group identity-even where
race is used as a factor in identifying such communities. This Part
thus concludes that electoral districting, even under recent constitu-
tional limitations, contributes to better representation in the legisla-
tive process of minority groups-racial and otherwise.
Part IV applies Part HIs lessons concerning the facilitation of
representative legislatures through districting to jury selection. Such
an application suggests a means for creating representative juries
without implicating equal protection concerns. The discussion focuses
primarily on a proposal for jury selection, "jural districting", that is
closely analogous to electoral districting. In brief, this method divides
a jury district into twelve sub-districts, drawn around "communities
of interest," and requires that each petit jury contain one juror from
each sub-district. Drawing on electoral districting experience, such a
24. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Reapportionment; Court Questions
Districts Drawn to Aid Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1993, at Al (stating that "[a] sharply
divided Supreme Court ruled today that designing legislative districts to increase black
representation can violate the constitutional rights of white voters."); Dick Lehr, Court Casts
Doubts over Race-Based Redistricting, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 1993, at Natl/Foreign 1 ("The
U.S. Supreme Court... ruled yesterday that congressional districts designed to give minorities
a voting majority may be unconstitutional. .. ").
25. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 7, at 741-42; King, supra note 10, at 719-42; King &
Munsterman, supra note 17, at 276-77.
26. See supra note 23 for cases in which the Supreme Court has used the term
"communities of interest" in the context of electoral districting.
1999] 359
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selection method would tend to create more consistently diverse juries
than do current selection procedures that select jurors on an "at large"
basis. Alternative districting approaches that retain the central in-
sight of creating jury diversity through geographical diversity but
which minimize some of the practical limitations of requiring every
jury to contain one juror from each sub-district are also considered in
Part IV.
II. THE QUEST FOR REPRESENTATIVE JURIES
Court reformers and administrators have sought to design jury
selection procedures that enhance the extent to which juries consis-
tently represent a broad cross-section of the surrounding
community.2 7 The following section describes the principal reasons for
desiring representative juries. Part II.B then examines the most
ambitious and controversial proposals for creating representative
juries. The constitutional implications that such proposals raise are
considered in Part II.C.
A. The Desirability of Representative Juries
While there is substantial justification for finding representa-
tive juries more desirable than nonrepresentative juries, 28 there is
27. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 7, at 707-17 (listing various plans that involve racial
quotas); King, supra note 10, at 719-29 (describing 'jurymandering techniques" in the context of
venue choice, jury district boundaries, source lists, qualified lists and venires, grand juries, trial
juries, and foreperson selection); King & Munsterman, supra note 17, at 274-76 (describing
"stratified selection," a method of restoring the racial or ethnic diversity to source lists, ethnic
conscious plans, and a post-qualification balancing plan).
28. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 495 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(observing that the fair cross-section requirement assures impartiality, guards against exercise
of arbitrary power, preserves public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system,
and promotes civic responsibility); Alschuler, supra note 7, at 717 (explaining that the Supreme
Court's recognition of the importance of representative juries justifies a departure from the
standard used in equal protection cases to determine assertedly discriminatory government
action); King, supra note 10, at 751 (identifying three purposes served by racially diverse juries:
(1) impartial decisionmaking; (2) public respect for and acceptance of criminal proceedings and
results thereof; and (3) civic participation in criminal jury service by all groups); King &
Munsterman, supra note 17, at 274 (arguing that underrepresentation of minorities on juries
undermines public trust in jury fairness, deprives minority citizens of civic participation in jury
service, and may lead to underinformed jury decisions); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race
Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 746-50
(1992) (arguing that nonrepresentative juries impoverish factfinding, contribute to less reliable
verdicts, and damage public confidence in the fairness of the justice system); Tanya E. Coke,
Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, But Is She a Soul Sister? Race-Neutrality and the Ideal of
Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 351 (1994) (arguing representative juries enhance
jury deliberation and promote public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system);
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considerable debate over the actual purposes served by representa-
tiveness. At least three important purposes have been advanced:
representativeness (1) improves the quality of jury decision-making;29
(2) enhances the jury's political legitimacy as a democratically
inclusive institution;30 and (3) serves to educate jurors from the
various represented groups about the nature and importance of civic
participation.
3 1
With respect to the quality of jury decision-making, juries an-
chor a trial process designed to determine facts and to reach verdicts
in accordance with legal and normative standards. The jury performs
this function by viewing the evidence presented and deliberating as a
group to reach a consensus verdict. This decision-making function,
including both fact-finding and normative judgments, is plausibly en-
hanced by representative compositions. The jury's fact-finding func-
tion may be enhanced by a representative composition in several
ways. First, to the extent that individual jurors may be biased to
some degree, representation of different groups may minimize the
effect of any bias by balancing the biases of some jurors with those of
see also infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text (describing proposals advanced by different
reformers designed to create more representative juries).
29. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (noting that the exclusion of any large
segment of the community from jury service robs the deliberative process of perspectives that
may have "unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented"); Alschuler, supra note
7, at 732 (arguing that inclusion of minority jurors can enhance the fairness and effectiveness of
jury decisions even in cases that do not present racially sensitive issues); Nancy J. King,
Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury
Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 99-100 (1993) (arguing that empirical studies demonstrate that
jury discrimination affects jury decisions). But see Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane,
Constructing a Jury That is Both Impartial and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in
Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 710 (1998) (arguing that "[ilt is less than clear whether
the racial, ethnic, gender, or other demographics of a jury actually effect a change in verdicts");
Underwood, supra note 28, at 731 (arguing that "the Court has clearly rejected the theory that
race-based jury selection denies equal protection to black defendants by producing biased juries
and unreliable verdicts").
30. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (stating that "[clommunity participa-
tion in the administration of the criminal law.., is not only consistent with our democratic
heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system");
Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and
Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 504 (1986) (arguing that "[wjhat a jury 'looks like' to the
community will affect the community's respect for the verdict."); Coke, supra note 28, at 351; see
also sources cited supra note 28 and infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
31. See Vikram, David Amar, Jury Service As Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 203, 221 (1995) (citing de Tocqueville's conclusion that juries are the most
effective way of establishing popular sovereignty and the most efficient way of teaching the
population how to rule itself); see also sources cited supra note 28 and infra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:353
others.32 In this way, the deliberations of a broadly representative
jury can be marked by a "diffused impartiality.33 Representativeness
would also aid in the determination of facts by bringing to the jury
room a wider range of experiences and perspectives. These
experiences would help, in the first instance, in determining the
objective facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged crime.
Moreover, a diversity of viewpoints would particularly aid in resolving
factual questions of a less determinate nature. For example, whether
a defendant reasonably feared for his life, whether a suspect was
acting suspiciously, or whether police conduct amounted to
entrapment, may depend on whose experiences or cultural values are
consulted. Diversity on a jury would help to ensure that decisions of
this sort reflect a consensus among potentially differing judgments.
The representative character of a jury should also enhance its
capacity to reach a community consensus with respect to normative,
moral, or otherwise subjective judgments. Thus, for example,
whether the heinousness of a murder warrants the death penalty over
life imprisonment, whether allegedly obscene material has redeeming
value,4 or whether a defendant, though technically guilty, should be
32. "No individual is totally objective; all people have their own personal views and experi-
ences.... The jury is an attempt to minimize bias in all of us by drawing a group of persons
from the community and trusting that the combination of differing perspectives will balance
out." VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at xiii; see also Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving 'Its
Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 552 (1975); Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the
Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment As a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory
Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 124 (1990); Johnson, supra note 21, at 1615-16; Lewis H.
LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841, 848 (1976); Massaro, supra note 30,
at 511, 533-35; McDougall, supra note 21, at 533-35, 547-48.
33. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975) (citation omitted); Thiel v. Southern
Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
34. Whether material is obscene is to be judged in light of local community standards as
determined by a jury drawn from that community. In order to fairly determine the "average"
community standards of obscenity, a jury should, as much as practicable, represent a cross-
section of the community. See Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating
that "the jury should not use sensitive persons as a standard, and emphasized that in determin-
ing the 'average person' standard the jury 'must include the sensitive and the insensitive, in
other words ... everyone in the community" (citation omitted)); United States v. Sanders, 592
F.2d 788, 796 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that jury in obscenity case is "to consider the community
as a whole, young and old, educated and uneducated, religious and the irreligious"); United
States v. Linetsky, 533 F.2d 192, 203 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that the "application of local com-
munity standards by different triers of fact assures a degree of diversity in obscenity determi-
nations"); United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1973) (stating that 'iflor the trial
of obscenity cases under federal law 'the community' should logically embrace that area from
which the jury is drawn and selected"). Indeed, of particular interest to the geographically-
based jury selection procedure advanced in this Article, see infra Part IV, the Supreme Court
has suggested that states may define the community whose standards shall determine what is
obscene by manipulating the boundaries of the jury district from which the jury to hear a case
shall be drawn. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 303 (1977) ("If a State wished to
adopt a slightly different approach to obscenity regulation, it might impose a geographic limit on
362
1999] JURAL DISTRICTING 363
acquitted in light of either his moral innocence or the condemnable
conduct of government officers, 35 are questions which representative
juries are particularly well-suited to resolve. In this way, juries can
more realistically represent the community's conscience.
The jury may benefit from inclusive selection in yet another
way. A more representative jury should carry more political legiti-
macy. By legitimacy, I mean the extent to which jury verdicts are
perceived by both litigants36 and the public3 7 as worthy of acceptance
because they are the product of a democratically inclusive process.
Even if there is no difference between verdicts from representative
and non-representative juries,38 verdicts from the former may have
greater legitimacy. 9 As an instrument of public justice, the jury's le-
the determination of community standards by defining the area from which the jury could be
selected in an obscenity case .... ).
35. Whether it is ever appropriate for juries to acquit defendants they believe to be techni-
cally or factually guilty, commonly referred to as the practice of jury nullification, is a matter of
intense controversy. My point here is limited to the proposition that jury nullification is more
likely to be perceived as legitimate when the composition of the jury exercising this power is
diverse rather than homogeneous in character.
36. See Massaro, supra note 30, at 544 (discussing how the parties' opinion of the jury's
impartiality affects the legitimacy of the jury itself).
37. Thus, as the Supreme Court observed in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975),
"[clommunity participation in the administration of the criminal law ... is not only consistent
with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the
criminal justice system." See also Massaro, supra note 30, at 504 (stating that "[wihat a jury
'looks like' to the community will affect the community's respect for the verdict").
38. See Massaro, supra note 30, at 542, 546-48 (concluding that non-representative juries
may nonetheless reach impartial verdicts).
39. As de Tocqueville observed, "[tihe jury is both the most effective way of establishing
the people's rule and the most efficient way of teaching them how to rule." Amar, supra note 31,
at 221 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA app. I at 254 (J.P. Mayer &
Max Lerner eds. & George Lawrence trans., 1966)). Thus, the jury "should be regarded as a free
school which is always open and in which each juror learns his rights,... and is given practical
lessons in the law." Id. (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra, at 252-53).
Consider, for example, the extent to which public disillusionment over the acquittal of the
police officers prosecuted for beating Rodney King stemmed from the observable absence of any
African-Americans on the jury. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 722 (agreeing with Andrew Deiss
that "even Americans whose own view of the videotape evidence initially persuaded them of the
guilt of the police officers who beat Rodney King probably would have seen the officers'
acquittals as just (or at least as acceptable) if these verdicts had been rendered by an
all-African-American jury") (citing Andrew G. Deiss, Negotiating Justice: The Criminal Jury
Trial in a Pluralist America 23, 51 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Albert W.
Alschuler)). Lamenting the absence of African-Americans from that jury, Professor Kenneth
Nunn writes:
in a case so clearly implicating racism, why were there no Blacks on the jury? Whether
Blacks were excluded 'intentionally,' or whether their underrepresentation was a simple
matter of demographics, their absence from the jury casts a shadow over the verdict, a
shadow lengthened by the history of discrimination against African-Americans in this
country.
Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 66 (1993).
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gitimacy depends on the extent to which it speaks for all of us. When
the jury fails to represent certain groups, members of those groups
may justifiably doubt the extent to which the system represents their
interests, respects their judgments, or welcomes their participation.
When juries are broadly representative, in contrast, their verdicts can
more readily be accepted as representing the consensus of the com-
munity.
Finally, representativeness may enhance the educative func-
tion of jury service for the jurors themselves. Jury service provides an
opportunity for citizens to participate in and exercise the power of
self-government.4 Trial judges have long recognized the educational
importance of jury service, taking the opportunity to teach the jurors
about the responsibility of civic virtue and self-government.41 The in-
clusion of people from all the various groups residing throughout a
community in the jury provides the opportunity for every group to
participate in the administration of justice.42 Representativeness
serves to educate jurors about the possibility and importance of coop-
eration among members of different groups in exercising governmen-
tal power. Through deliberation with jurors from different groups or
classes, jurors on representative panels learn to work together toward
the shared goal of determining guilt or innocence in accordance with
law and the community's sense of justice.
There is thus a real debate in the literature about the purpose
of jury representativeness. Some commentators argue that represen-
tativeness increases the accuracy or reliability of verdicts. 43 Other
40. As de Tocqueville observed, "[tihe jury is both the most effective way of establishing
the people's rule and the most efficient way of teaching them how to rule." Amar, supra note 31,
at 221 (quoting DE TOCQUEV=hLE, supra note 39, at 254). Thus, the jury "should be regarded as
a free school which is always open and in which each juror learns his rights,... and is given
practical lessons in the law." Id. (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 39, at 252-53).
41. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1186-
87 (1991) (discussing historical role of 'jurors as pupils").
42. Stressing the civic value of jury service (and, interestingly, noting a parallel between
jury service and voting rights), the Court in Powers v. Ohio observed:
The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of justice has
long been recognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury sys-
tem .... It "affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in a process
of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a respect for the law." Indeed with
the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their
most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1991) (citation omitted); see also Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 474, 496-97 (1990) (observing that right of black persons to serve on juries affirms their
right to participate in the criminal justice system); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)
(asserting that peremptorily challenging black jurors on account of their race denies to them
"the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the
white population" (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,224 (1965)).
43. See supra note 29.
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commentators argue that juries are essentially political institutions
whose legitimacy depends on their representative character.44 Still
other commentators look to representative juries as an opportunity
for all groups to participate and cooperate in the process of popular
government.45 It is not necessary, for present purposes, to determine
which of these interests is the most important or most effectively
served by representative juries. The point is that any or all of these
purposes may be served by juries that represent a wide variety of
groups residing within a jurisdiction. The more representative a jury
is the more its verdicts can be trusted by the parties and public at
large as accurate, consistent with community values, and as produced
by an inclusive process with democratic legitimacy.
B. Overview of Affirmative Selection Procedures
The reality, however, is that jury selection procedures have re-
sulted in juries that underrepresent distinct groups, especially racial
minorities, with serious consequences.46 Responding to the deepening
delegitimization of the jury system, court reformers and scholars have
advanced various proposals to achieve greater and more consistent
representation of minority groups on juries. This Subpart reviews
those proposals commonly referred to as "affirmative selection" proce-
dures. Such proposals would permit or require race-conscious meth-
ods for selecting juries, thereby ensuring representativeness, at least
with respect to race.47 At the same time, the intentional use of race
under such procedures presents challenging and possibly insur-
mountable practical and constitutional difficulties.
Several court administrators and judges are considering race-
conscious measures to increase minority representation at all stages
of jury selection.48 These affirmative selection reforms fall into three
general categories: racial quotas, litigant choice, and geographically-
targeted selection.
44. See supra note 30.
45. See supra note 31.
46. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
48. As Professor King observes, "[t]he race of potential jurors is now considered by judges
choosing trial venues, by jury commissioners selecting names for jury source lists, by jury clerks
selecting names of qualified jurors, and by judges choosing grand jurors and grand jury foreper-
sons." Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Public Confidence in the
Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1177, 1178-79 (1994).
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The first of these general approaches would directly ensure ra-
cial representativeness on juries through the use of racial quotas.49
For instance, according to Professor Alschuler:
In Arizona, a bar committee has proposed dividing jury lists into subsets by
race and drawing jurors from each subset. Some Arizona judges currently
strike trial juries that, in their view, do not include adequate numbers of mi-
nority jurors. In DeKalb County, Georgia, jury commissioners divide jury lists
into thirty-six demographic groups (for example, black females aged 35 to 44);
they then use a computer to ensure the proportional representation of every
group on every venire.50
Still other quota proposals would require that half or at least three
members of the jury share the defendant's racial or ethnic identity.5'
A proposal that has been considered in Hennepin County, Minnesota,
would require that at least two jurors on every grand jury be a mem-
ber of a racial minority.52
A second general approach to creating diversity on juries
would rely on litigant choice. 53 Three specific examples will be de-
scribed. The first would allow litigants to choose a certain number of
venire-persons, already screened for cause, for inclusion in a "mini-
venire" to which the court would include additional jurors selected
randomly from the larger venire.M The litigants would then use per-
emptory challenges until the number of jurors is reduced to the ap-
propriate number for trial. A second proposal involving litigant choice
would permit the parties to list twelve jurors of preference.55 The
court would impanel any juror common to both lists, followed by al-
ternating between the lists until the sufficient number were seated.6
The third example of a procedure involving litigant choice would per-
mit the parties a small number of "peremptory inclusions," which the
parties could use to include particular venirepersons on the petit jury
49. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 7, at 707-11; Johnson, supra note 21, at 1698-99;
Potash, supra note 21, at 82-95.
50. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 711 (footnotes omitted).
51. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 1698-99 (noting that studies show that without at least
three minority jurors, group pressure is too overwhelming).
52. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 707-11.
53. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 21, at 802-12 (proposing a system of affirmative selection
that allows the parties to seat rather than exclude particular jurors). See generally Meyer,
supra note 21.
54. See Ramirez, supra note 21. Professor Ramirez calls her solution the "affirmative per-
emptory choice." Id. at 1223. The term "mini-venire" is used by Professor King in describing
Ramirez's proposal. King, supra note 48, at 1200.
55. See Altman, supra note 21, at 806.
56. See id.
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without challenge by the opposing party except for cause.57 In this
way, although not ensuring diversity in every case, it would allow liti-
gants to create diversity through their inclusive choices in cases
where the litigants deemed such diversity desirable.
In addition to the use of racial quotas and litigant choice to
create diversity on juries, a third general approach would rely on ge-
ography to increase racial diversity on juries. Under this approach,
areas populated predominantly by members of minority groups could
be sent additional jury summonses to increase the number of minori-
ties that appear for jury service.58  Alternatively, the district from
which jurors are drawn could be either expanded to include areas
where minorities commonly reside or circumscribed to reduce the area
populated by majority groups. Another geography-based proposal,
discussed in greater detail below,59 would sub-divide a jury district
into twelve sub-districts and draw each juror for a petit jury from a
different sub-district.6 Thus, by identifying racial or ethnic residen-
tial patterns, geographically-based selection procedures such as these
and others61 offer a practical means for increasing jury representa-
tiveness.
57. See Meyer, supra note 21, at 280-81.
58. Federal district courts in both Michigan and Connecticut, for example, have sent addi-
tional jury questionnaires to parts of the district where greater numbers of minority persons
lived in order to increase the representation of those groups in the jury pool. See King, supra
note 10, at 723 (discussing the use of this process by the United States District Court in the
Eastern District of Michigan); King & Munsterman, supra note 17, at 275 (discussing current
procedure in the District of Connecticut).
59. See infra Part IV.
60. Such a proposal was made by Lindsay Jones, an attorney formerly with the Minnesota
Attorney General's office, now working for the Minnesota Urban League. His proposal would
divide Minneapolis, Minnesota into twelve 'jury seat districts" and require each petit jury to
contain one juror from each jury seat district. The purpose of the proposal was to increase the
representation of traditionally underrepresented minority groups. Mr. Jones assumed his
proposal would have to satisfy strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Although he
argued it could be satisfied, he acknowledged the difficulty such a standard presents. See
Lindsay R.M. Jones, Democratizing the Jury Selection Process: A Multi-Pool Stratification
Model (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also King, supra note 48, at
1198-1200 (describing Jones' proposal and concluding that it would probably not survive
constitutional scrutiny). What I hope to do in this Article is to analyze such a proposal, and
other districting methods, under electoral districting doctrine. Viewed through this lens, the
constitutional difficulties are far less formidable.
61. For a description of several selection procedures, implemented or proposed, that take
advantage of racial or ethnic residential patterns, see King & Munsterman, supra note 17, at
274-76.
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C. Constitutional Implications of Affirmative Selection Procedures
Race-conscious selection procedures designed to create repre-
sentative juries implicate two constitutional provisions: the Sixth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Some of the cases de-
cided under these provisions provide support for affirmative selection
procedures, while others provide a more ambiguous, even contradic-
tory, message about the permissibility of representativeness-by-de-
sign.62 These ambiguities reflect the Supreme Court's ambivalence
concerning the effect of representativeness on the quality of jury deci-
sion-making. In discussing these points, this Subpart begins with the
Sixth Amendment and the "fair cross-section" requirement. It then
focuses on the implications of race-conscious jury selection under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.63
The development of the fair cross-section standard under the
Sixth Amendment seems chiefly premised on the view that diverse
composition enhances the quality and accuracy of jury deliberation.
In Smith v. Texas, 64 the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the con-
cept of the jury as "a body truly representative of the community."65
To this end, the Court subsequently declared, it "is an essential com-
ponent of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial" that the petit
jury be drawn "from a representative cross section of the commu-
nity."66 In cases applying this fair cross-section requirement, the Court
invalidated jury selection procedures that systematically excluded certain
"cognizable groups" from the venire, such as racial and ethnic
minorities, 67 women,68 and members of particular socioeconomic classes.69
62. See infra notes 63-92 and accompanying text.
63. Although the issue of jury composition first arose in a case involving the Equal
Protection Clause, see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), I shall discuss the Sixth
Amendment first because its relevance for the jury selection process is limited to the initial
selection of the venire, and because the most recent constitutional developments in jury selec-
tion have occurred under the Equal Protection Clause.
64. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
65. Id. at 130.
66. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
67. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (discussing the systematic exclusion
of persons of Mexican descent from jury service).
68. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (holding that state statutes which auto-
matically exempt women from jury service unless the women request to serve and result in jury
venires of below 15 percent female on average violate the fair cross-section requirement of the
Constitution); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522 (holding that systematic exclusion of females from jury
service resulting in unrepresentative jury pools violates the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
69. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1946) (invalidating systematic
exclusion of wage earners).
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The principal cases that laid the foundation for the fair
cross-section doctrine reveal a Court concerned with the effect that
underrepresentativeness might have on jury deliberations and ver-
dicts. The Court did not explicitly refer to a "cross-section" require-
ment until the 1940s. 70 Even then, it based the requirement on the
Court's supervisory power over the Federal courts. In Ballard v.
United States71 the Court struggled to explain why excluding women
jeopardized the jury's function:
The thought is that the factors which tend to influence the action of women are
the same as those which influence the action of men-personality, background,
economic status-and not sex. Yet it is not enough to say that women when
sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a class .... The truth is that the
two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different
from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on
the other is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either
may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct
quality is lost if either sex is excluded. 72
In 1972, a plurality of the Court in Peters v. Kiff,73 relied on
due process grounds to invalidate the exclusion of blacks from grand
and petit jury pools, observing:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from
jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human na-
ture and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and
perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group
will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclu-
70. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946) (invalidating systematic ex-
clusion of women); Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220 (invalidating systematic exclusion of wage earners as
inconsistent with the concept of a civil or criminal jury, which "necessarily contemplates" an
impartial group "drawn from a cross-section of the community."). The Court first used the
phrase "cross section" in dicta four years before Thiel and Ballard in Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (disapproving jury selection practice but denying claim for lack of proof).
Earlier cases, although not explicitly discussing a "fair cross-section" standard, had discussed
the importance of jury representativeness in the context of equal protection. See, e.g., Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (invalidating, under the Equal Protection Clause, a state prac-
tice of excluding blacks from juries, and observing that "[i]t is part of the established tradition in
the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of
the community"). For a fuller discussion of the development of the fair cross-section
requirement, see Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A
Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 949-60 (1998).
71. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 196 (relying on supervisory power over federal courts to prohibit
exclusion of women from the venire).
72. Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted), quoted with approval in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 133-34 (1994).
73. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Stewart, JJ.).
Three justices concurred in the judgment on statutory grounds. See id. (White, J., concurring in
judgment, joined by Brennan and Powell, JJ.).
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sion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsus-
pected importance in any case that may be presented.74
By 1975, a majority of the Court, in Taylor v. Louisiana,7s held that
the fair cross-section requirement is constitutionally mandated by the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury in criminal trials.76
In so holding, the Court relied on the reasoning of Ballard concerning
the contribution of representativeness to the deliberations of the
jury.77
In contrast, the Court has elsewhere resisted the claim that
racial composition affects the quality or impartiality of jury decisions.
Thus, the Court has consistently denied that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees the right to a representative petit jury in any given case,
provided no groups are intentionally or systematically excluded from
the venire from which the petit jury is drawn.7 8 Indeed, the Sixth
Amendment does not even prohibit the intentional exclusion of cogni-
zable groups from the petit jury by use of the peremptory challenge,
even if such challenges leave those groups underrepresented on, or
completely absent from, the petit jury.79 Certainly a plausible reading
of the Court's refusal even to inquire into the representativeness of a
given petit jury, absent allegations of systematic exclusion at the ve-
nire stage, bespeaks a belief that representativeness does not seri-
74. Id. at 503-04 (Marshall, J.).
75. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
76. Id. at 528. The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Court further held in Taylor that the fair cross-
section requirement was incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526-28.
77. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531-32 (stating that "[tihe truth is the two sexes are not
fungible;... the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the imponderables. To
insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a
flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded." (quoting Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-94).
78. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 305 (1879)); see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (stating that a
criminal defendant is not entitled to jurors of his or her ethnic group, but is entitled to be tried
by juries from which members of ethnic groups are not systematically excluded); Cassell v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950) (stating that the Constitution does not require a proportional
representation of races on a jury, but only a fair jury, selected without regard to race); Akins v.
Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945) (holding that the mere fact that there was only one grand jury
member of the defendant's race is not proof, in and of itself, of discrimination); Martin v. Texas,
200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906) (holding that the allegation of discrimination by the criminal defendant
was not established simply by proving that no one of his race was on the grand or petit juries);
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1881) (stating that the Constitution does not require an
ethnically mixed jury, simply one selected without discrimination).
79. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474,478,487 (1990).
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ously affect verdicts.8° Similarly, the Court denied a habeas claim
that the Sixth Amendment imposed a fair cross-section requirement
on the petit jury on the ground that such a "new rule," even if valid,
should not be applied retroactively "[b]ecause the absence of a fair
cross section on the jury venire does not undermine the fundamental
fairness that must underlie a conviction or seriously diminish the
likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction."s Thus, while the
Court's decisions interpreting a fair cross-section requirement as part
of the Sixth Amendments guarantee of an impartial jury suggests
that representativeness is critical to the jury's function, the Court's
subsequent limitation of the fair cross-section requirement to the ve-
nire stage suggests instead that representativeness is not crucial to
the jury's function.
Court decisions applying the Equal Protection Clause to jury
selection also reveal a Court of two minds with respect to the effect of
representativeness on jury verdicts. At the venire stage of jury selec-
tion, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the exclusion of protected
classes although, unlike the Sixth Amendment, it invalidates only
those procedures that intentionally exclude such groups.8 2  In
Strauder v. West Virginia, the first case to apply equal protection to
jury selection procedures, the Court invalidated the exclusion of black
jurors in part on the ground that "[i]t is well known that prejudices
often exist against particular classes in the community, which sway
the judgment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate in some cases to
deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection
which others enjoy."83 Moreover, in contrast to the fair cross-section
requirement, the Equal Protection Clause extends to the post-venire
selection of the petit jury, prohibiting the use of peremptory chal-
80. But see infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing possible explanation for
not imposing fair cross-section requirement on petit jury that is consistent with the view that
representativeness may affect jury impartiality).
81. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315 (1989); see also Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 32
(1975) (holding that the fair cross-section requirement recognized in Taylor was not to be given
retroactive effect because it "[does] not rest on the premise that every criminal trial, or any
particular trial, [is] necessarily unfair because it [is] not conducted in accordance with what we
determined to be the requirements of the Sixth Amendment").
82. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976) (holding that Equal Protection
Clause violation requires proof of discriminatory intent).
83. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880).
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lenges to strike jurors based on race,8 ethnicity,6 or gender.86 In this
respect at least, equal protection limitations provide stronger protec-
tion than the Sixth Amendment against litigant efforts to exclude
cognizable groups from the jury.
However, in more recent cases applying the Equal Protection
Clause to peremptory challenges, the Court seems to have repudiated
the claim that representativeness has any significant effect on jury
outcomes. Rejecting the claim that race is probative of juror bias or
competence, 87 the Court characterizes attempts to justify peremptory
challenges based on race as employing "the very stereotype the law
condemns."88 In order to reconcile its denial that discriminatory jury
selection creates a significant risk of bias with its unwavering stance
since Batson that racially motivated peremptory challenges are un-
constitutional, the Court has shifted its focus to the rights of the ex-
cluded juror.8 9 In so doing, the Court seems to have repudiated its
84. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992) (prohibiting race-based peremptory
challenges by criminal defendant); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) (prohibiting such
challenges against black jurors by prosecution where defendant was white); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (prohibiting race-based peremptory challenges by prosecution against
black jurors in case where defendant was also black); cf Edmonson v. Leesvifle Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (prohibiting race-based peremptory challenges in civil cases). As in
Strauder, the Batson Court seemed concerned with the effect that excluding black jurors might
have on the functioning of the jury. In explaining the dangers of purposeful discrimination in
the selection of the venire, the Court stated that "[tlhose on the venire must be 'indifferently
chosen,' to secure the defendant's right under the Fourteenth Amendment to 'protection of life
and liberty against race or color prejudice.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87 (quoting Strauder, 100
U.S. at 309)).
85. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (stating that it would violate the
Equal Protection Clause for a prosecutor to use peremptory challenges to exclude Latino jurors
because of their ethnicity).
86. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31, 141-42 (1994) (holding that
discrimination injury selection on the basis of gender violates the Equal Protection Clause).
87. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991); see also Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255,
259 (1986) (limiting retroactive effect of rule announced in Batson because rule did not have "a
fundamental impact on the integrity of factfinding").
88. Powers, 499 U.S. at 410 (rejecting use of race to determine "the objectivity or qualifica-
tions of a juror" because "[wle may not accept as a defense to racial discrimination the very
stereotype the law condemns").
89. Although the Court acknowledged the rights of the excluded jurors as early as
Strauder, by Powers, the Court relied exclusively on the jurors' rights, viewing the defendant's
objection to racially motivated peremptory challenges as a question of third-party standing to
raise the rights of the excluded jurors. Id. at 410-416; see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129-31
(holding that litigant has standing to raise equal protection rights of jurors peremptorily
challenged on the basis of sex); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (holding that
prosecution has standing to raise the rights of jurors against race-based peremptory challenges
by defendants); cf Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628-30 (granting private litigant in civil trial third-
party standing to raise rights of black jurors subject to discriminatory peremptory challenges).
1999] JURAL DISTRICTING 373
apparent holding in Strauder that racially discriminatory jury selec-
tion violates the defendant's rights by creating biased juries.90
The Court thus has created a paradox in its application of fair
cross-section and equal protection principles to jury selection. The
Court has, under both doctrines, forbidden the exclusion of certain
groups from jury service because such exclusion would deprive the
jury of valuable perspectives. More recently, the Court has rejected
the claim that discrimination in the selection of the petit jury deprives
the defendant of an impartial jury or of equal protection.91 Indeed,
any affirmative attempt to create racial or ethnic representation by
the use of peremptory challenges is forbidden.
9 2
Affirmative selection procedures analyzed under these doc-
trines raise difficult questions. Proponents of affirmative selection
procedures recognize the support provided by the Sixth Amendment's
fair cross-section requirement.93 Less noticed, however, are the poten-
tial difficulties presented by the fair cross-section standard. The wide
net required by this standard seems premised on the view that juries
should include as many experiences and viewpoints as practicable.
90. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880); see also Alschuler, supra note
4, at 188-91 (interpreting Strauder as based on assumption that racial composition may bias the
jury).
91. For an interesting discussion of the paradoxical position taken by the Court with
respect to the effect of diversity on jury verdicts, see Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox:
Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 96-99 (1996.
92. The use of the peremptory challenge to affirmatively create diversity may seem
counterintuitive given that its direct effect is exclusionary, not inclusionary. The peremptory
challenge could serve a litigant's interest in creating diversity on a jury, however, by striking
jurors who share a similar background with those jurors already seated, thereby increasing the
chance that a juror from a different background will be seated. For example, a black defendant
might use peremptory challenges to strike prospective white jurors in order to enhance the
possibility that black jurors will be seated. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. which stated that
"f[t]he only possible chance the [minority] defendant may have of having any minority jurors on
the jury that actually tries him will be if he uses his peremptories to strike members of the
majority race." Amicus Curiae Brief of NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, at 9-10,
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 69 (1992) (footnotes omitted)). Because the Court has now
banned all peremptory challenges based on race, however, such challenges can no longer be
used to secure minority representation on juries. Cf McCollum, 505 U.S. at 61-62 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (criticizing application of Equal Protection Clause to criminal defendants'
peremptory challenges because black defendants will lose a means for securing black jurors); id.
at 68-69 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same).
93. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 7, at 717 (concluding that the fair cross-section
requirement looks more to effect); Johnson, supra note 21, at 1655-56; King, supra note 10, at
747; Altman, supra note 21, at 783 (discussing Sixth Amendment jurisprudence); Cockrell,
supra note 21, at 378 (noting that a process that produces more diverse juries is "more in line
with the Sixth Amendments right to a fair cross-section than other methods"); Meyer, supra
note 21, at 255 (arguing that a criminal defendant needs a mechanism which achieves a
representative jury panel in order to protect the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a fair trial and
an impartial jury).
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The failure to require representativeness on the petit jury is not nec-
essarily inconsistent with this account. Countervailing considerations
may outweigh the imposition of a representational requirement on the
petit jury. These considerations include the potentially restrictive ef-
fect of a representational requirement on the free exercise of peremp-
tory challenges, 9 the practical impossibility of fulfilling a representa-
tional requirement on every petit jury, 95 and the risk that in specify-
ing which groups to include in a representational requirement some
significant groups may inadvertently be excluded. 96 As to the last
point, the concern is that any attempt to define a representative petit
jury based on any particular demographic characteristic, such as race,
94. One reason for not extending the fair cross-section requirement to the petit jury is
that it could impair the litigants' discretion in the exercise of peremptory challenges, a practice
which the Court has endorsed as contributing to jury impartiality. See Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (stating that "[pleremptory challenges... are a means of 'eliminat[ing]
extremes of partiality on both sides,' thereby 'assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased
jury.'" (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)). This explanation is consistent with
the proposition that representativeness affects impartiality. Indeed, in refusing to extend the
Sixth Amendment to the petit jury, the Holland Court explicitly acknowledged that a venire
representing a fair cross-section is a means of assuring an impartial jury. See id. at 480. The
purpose of the fair cross-section requirement, the Court explained, is to equalize the ability of
both sides to use their peremptory challenges to exclude jurors that may be ill disposed to their
side. If the State could skew the representative character of the pool or venire, it could "stack
the deck" and "would have, in effect, unlimited peremptory challenges to compose the pool in its
favor." Id. at 481. Under this view, impartiality begins with a representative venire and then,
"once a fair hand is dealt," each side may "use peremptory challenges to eliminate prospective
jurors belonging to groups it believes would unduly favor the other side." Id.
95. A second explanation for the Court's refusal to impose the fair cross-section require-
ment on the petit jury is the practical impossibility of including every cognizable group on each
petit jury. Thus, inBatson, after observing that "we have never held that the Sixth Amendment
requires that 'petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various
distinctive groups in the population,'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.6 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)), the Court concluded, "[indeed, it would be impossible to apply a
concept of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the heterogeneous nature of
our society." Id.; accord J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 145 n.19 (1994) (noting
that requiring "that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social,
religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community" would frequently be
impossible); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-74 (1986) (stating "[tlhe limited scope of the
fair-cross-section requirement is a direct and inevitable consequence of the practical
impossibility of providing each criminal defendant with a truly 'representative' petit jury")
(citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.6); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co, 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (stating
that the complete representation on every jury of all the economic, social, religious, racial,
political, and geographical groups of the community would frequently be impossible); cf Batson,
476 U.S. at 85 (denying that a defendant, under the Equal Protection Clause, has a right to a
"petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race" because "Itihe number of our
races and nationalities stands in the way of evolution of such a conception") (quoting,
respectively, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880), and Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S.
398, 403 (1945)).
96. Thus, in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 512 (1990), the Court stated that a require-
ment of representativeness on the basis of race would "distort the jury's reflection of other
groups in society, characterized by age, sex, ethnicity, religion, education level, or economic
class."
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may pose an intolerable risk that racial groups not included in the
quota or groups defined by characteristics other than race will consis-
tently be excluded or underrepresented.
Applied to affirmative selection procedures, especially racial
quotas, the fair cross-section requirement would arguably be under-
mined to the extent that any such procedure caused the underrepre-
sentation of other cognizable groups. A racial quota, for example, may
result in the exclusion of groups not included in the quota. If, for in-
stance, a quota called for a certain number of Caucasians, Asian-
Americans, African-Americans, Native Americans and Latinos, it may
result in the underrepresentation of, for example, Arabs or Indians (of
South Asia) to the extent such groups fell outside the defined catego-
ries. Or such a quota may cause the underrepresentation of people
defined by other demographic characteristics, such as religion or eco-
nomic class. If, for example, the vast majority of upper class people
are white, the reservation of a limited number of seats for white ju-
rors may result in the underrepresentation of upper class persons
since white-juror slots could be filled by non-upper class whites. 97 I
recognize that the effect of a quota on unintended groups is not easily
predicted and that quotas might be defined in such a broad and inclu-
sive manner that members of any relevant group would be selected for
jury service, at least in the long term, as frequently as under current
procedures. To the extent such procedures would tend to underrepre-
sent certain groups, however, they may implicate the Sixth
Amendment.
More obvious than the Sixth Amendment as a limitation on
affirmative selection procedures is the Equal Protection Clause. The
difficulties presented by equal protection doctrine have been elabo-
rated elsewhere,98 so I will only briefly sketch them here. As
described above, the Supreme Court has invalidated race-conscious
jury selection procedures when used to exclude jurors both at the
venire stage, where jurors are drawn from the community, and during
selection of the petit jury. Although these cases involved the
exclusion ofjurors, the Court's approach to affirmative action suggests
that it would be equally unsympathetic to the use of race in order to
include minority jurors. At the very least, as most scholars
97. Procedures that rely on litigant choice to create representative juries would not seem
to face the same Sixth Amendment concerns as racial quotas. If the fair cross-section require-
ment does not apply to exclusionary peremptory challenges, it is difficult to see why it would
apply to peremptory inclusions. The Equal Protection Clause, however, would seem to be
implicated by litigant inclusions based on race.
98. See King, supra note 10, at 745-60.
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acknowledge, the Court would likely subject most race-conscious
selection procedures to strict scrutiny which, in practical terms, would
operate to invalidate them.99
III. RECONCILING THE PARADOX?: LESSONS FROM THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS
The Sixth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause thus place
serious obstacles in the way of race-conscious efforts to create consis-
tently representative juries. The principal issue I wish to explore is
whether principles and procedures employed for selecting members of
legislative bodies might shed some light on how representative juries
can be selected consistent with constitutional limitations.
Legislatures, as much as juries, are multi-membered deliberative in-
stitutions that best serve their function when their membership is
broadly representative of groups within the governed jurisdiction. An
examination of electoral procedures that enhance the representative
character of legislative bodies, therefore, may provide some insights
for the selection of representative juries.
This Part examines the legislature, comparing its nature as a
representative process with that of the jury, and explores the devel-
opment of electoral districting procedures designed to enhance the
legislature's representative character. It then examines recent consti-
tutional limitations placed on districting plans designed to increase
minority participation. Part IV will then return to the topic of jury se-
lection to explore whether electoral districting principles can be em-
ployed to select representative juries.
A. Legislatures and Representation
An examination of the function and nature of legislatures and
the electoral process reveals many of the same virtues as a jury sys-
tem in a broadly representative process. That is, as the following dis-
cussion explains, representativeness in the legislative process plausi-
bly improves the quality of legislative policies, enhances the legiti-
macy of those policies, and serves to educate and inspire members of
99. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 716 n.58 (1995) (noting that many scholars evaluating
Hennepin County grand jury quota believe it invalid or at least subject to strict scrutiny); King,
supra note 10, at 745-60 (arguing that in only a very narrow class of cases would race-conscious
jury selection satisfy strict scrutiny).
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represented groups about the political process and the possibility of
inter-group cooperation.
First, as with juries, participation in the legislative process by
a broad range of groups enhances the likelihood that substantive deci-
sions will properly take account of minority interests, racial and oth-
erwise. 100 As Professor John Hart Ely's influential process theory of
constitutional law holds, the protection of liberty and equality resides
in a political process that, by its nature, takes account of minority in-
terests.'0 The role of the judiciary is to police that process to ensure
that minority groups have meaningful access to the process both for-
mally and functionally. When effective representation is achieved,
the legislature is the proper institution for defining substantive rights
and policies. Representativeness thus enhances the reliability of the
legislative process to devise fair and desirable substantive policies.
Second, the political legitimacy of legislatures is also enhanced
by representativeness. 02 Legislatures are integral to the functioning
of our government as a democracy. The acceptability of legislatures,
like juries, depends in part on the extent to which their membership
represents the diverse constituencies within their jurisdictions. As
Professor Lani Guinier puts it, "ljlust as the flag stands for the na-
tion, the presence of racial group members symbolizes inclusion of a
100. See John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Symposium, Positive Political Theory and
Public Law: Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565, 569
(1992) (arguing that representative character of legislature enables it to more accurately discern
the common good); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights As an American
Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 83, 99 (1995) (arguing that "legislative bodies are
like juries: just as ensuring a fair cross-section on juries contributes to the search for truth
because it increases the likelihood that wisdom acquired from diverse experiences will be
available during the deliberative process, so too ensuring diversity on governing bodies will
increase the likelihood that wisdom acquired from both diverse experiences and interaction with
diverse constituencies will be available for legislative decision making") (citation omitted).
101. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISMUST 77-87 (1980) (discussing the impor-
tance of pluralist political process to proper functioning of representative system).
102. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 644 (1993) (arguing that
"increase[d] minority representation in the political sphere... supports systemic legitimacy by
permitting the construction of political bodies more broadly representative of American society
(contrast cultural readings of an all-white board of directors of a major corporation versus an
all-white state legislature)"); Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The
Question of Single-Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1174 (1993) (arguing that "[a]
homogeneous legislature in a heterogeneous society is simply not legitimate"); Karlan, supra
note 100, at 99 (arguing that "integration [in the legislative process] enhances the legitimacy of
that deliberative process by allaying fears that the distinctive perspective of minority groups
has been ignored"); Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking
Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REv. 909, 982 (1995) (arguing that legitimacy of laws
derives from representative composition of legislature enacting them).
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previously excluded group."oS This legislative legitimacy gained
through representativeness is distinct from the effect of representa-
tiveness on the content of legislation. As with juries, political legiti-
macy and the effect on outcomes will often be related. The public may
find laws enacted by a representative legislature more acceptable be-
cause it understands (or assumes) that the content of the legislation
reflects a real consensus among various interests. Moreover, repre-
sentativeness may give legitimacy to legislation even where the legis-
lation was not or does not appear to have been affected by the repre-
sentative character of the enacting body.l°4 Consider, for example, a
city's decision to adopt or abandon an affirmative action program.
Such a policy may be more acceptable to those adversely affected if
the city council included members who represented their interests,
even if the outcome were no different from that which an underrepre-
sentative council would have reached. 0 5
Third, the representative character of the legislative process
serves an educative function. The inclusion of a variety of groups in
the legislature and in the electoral process provides an opportunity for
members of those groups to engage in and learn the nature of political
participation. Moreover, an inclusive process enables members of dif-
ferent groups to work together in devising legislative policy and craft-
ing legislation in pursuance thereof. Such experience may help to
heal the rift between groups, particularly evident along racial lines, in
both the legislative process and other aspects of civil and political
life. 0 6
103. Guinier, supra note 102, at 1147.
104. See Schwarcz, supra note 102, at 982 (observing that "a legislature does not always
consider the perspectives of all parties potentially affected by its laws; the legitimacy of its laws
derives instead from the representative composition of its members").
105. Consider also President Clinton's 1992 campaign promise to make his cabinet "look
like America." See Judy Keen, Clinton to Be Held to Vow of Diversity, USA TODAY, Nov. 13,
1992, at Al. He seemed to view the inclusion of minority persons and women as legitimizing
the cabinet independent of whether those appointed would pursue different policies from other
comparably qualified white males.
106. Several scholars have endorsed the theory that interaction between members of
different racial groups on a constructive and equal basis can reduce prejudice and improve race
relations. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1071 (1991) (suggesting the positive effect of interracial contact on white racial views);
Elliot Aronson & Diane Bridgeman, Jigsaw Groups and the Desegregated Classroom: In Pursuit
of Common Goals, 5 PERSONAUTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 438, 441 (1979) (describing how
structured interracial work groups in schools increase self-esteem, morale, and interpersonal in-
teraction); Samuel L. Gaertner et al., The Contact Hypothesis: The Role of a Common Ingroup
Identity on Reducing Intergroup Bias, 25 SMALL GROUP RES. 224, 226 (1994) (discussing how
common identity facilitates interpersonal interaction); cf Cheryl L. Wade, When Judges Are
Gatekeepers: Democracy, Morality, Status, and Empathy in Duty Decisions (Help From
Ordinary Citizens), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 58 (1996) (noting that "[tihe jury process itself may
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Thus, similar to jury selection, the electoral process is legiti-
mately concerned with creating decision-making bodies that represent
various groups in the jurisdiction over which they exercise power. As
with juries, the representative character of the legislative process
plausibly serves a number of desirable purposes. The more represen-
tative a legislature is, the more it can be relied upon to produce sub-
stantive legislation that fairly takes account of the interests of various
groups residing within society. The inclusive character of the legisla-
tive process also enhances the legitimacy of the laws it enacts as a
product of a democratic system. Finally, a representative legislature
enables members of the represented groups to participate in self-gov-
ernment and to learn to work with members of other groups to find
common ground. While reasonable disagreement may arise over
which function is most effectively served by representativeness or
which function is most important, it is sufficient to observe that, for
any or all of the foregoing reasons, devising a representative electoral
process is a legitimate goal. As the following Subpart describes, how-
ever, such a goal has not often been achieved.
B. Underrepresentation and At-Large Districting
The history of the legislative process, like that of the jury, is
largely a story about the exclusion of minority participation. Prior to
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Strauder decision,
many states denied blacks the right to vote or serve on juries. Voting
laws that discriminated on their face, once invalidated, were replaced
by only slightly less obvious devices, such as literacy tests, grandfa-
ther clauses, and poll taxes, that prevented large numbers of racial
minorities from exercising the right to vote.10 7 The Supreme Court in-
validated a number of these practices until Congress responded with
the Voting Rights Act, which invalidated the remaining overt barriers
to minority voting.08
educate the jurors about citizens of different races, classes, sexual orientation, and physical
abilities").
107. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 102, at 629; Lani Guinier, The Triumph of
Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1077, 1093-101 (1991).
108. As Professor Lani Guinier observes:
The 1965 Voting Rights Act was a landmark piece of legislation. The Act responded
directly to the most urgent claims of activists challenging direct impediments to
registration and voting. In drafting the Act, Congress was concerned with eradicating
discrimination "comprehensively and finally" from every election in which voters were
eligible to cast ballots.
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Meaningful electoral participation for minority groups re-
mained elusive, however, due to the tendency of at-large electoral sys-
tems to stifle minority efforts to seek representation in the legislative
process.109 As Professors Aleinikoff and Issacharoff explain:
These [at-large] electoral systems permit all members of a community or elec-
toral jurisdiction to vote separately on each candidate for office, thereby allow-
ing a voting majority to control every seat in an election. For example, if a
community is sixty percent white and forty percent black, and if the two racial
groups have consistently different voting preferences, the result of an at-large
election for a city council in which black and white candidates vie for each of
five council positions would be that the white candidate would likely prevail in
each contest, with about sixty percent of the vote. In such cases, the perceived
harm is the capacity of a majority community to capture a disproportionate
share of representation through its ability to vote serially for each candidate
for local office. 110
Legislatures elected under at-large schemes routinely included few or
no representatives of minority groups. Instead, in jurisdictions em-
ploying at-large systems, elected officials tended to come from the
most socioeconomically and racially privileged groups, and often lived
in geographically-identifiable privileged neighborhoods. As candi-
dates favored by minority groups were continually defeated at the
polls and those officials that were elected ignored minority concerns,
many members of minority groups became increasingly apathetic and
cynical, leading to lower minority turnout in subsequent elections."'
The tendency of at-large electoral systems to dilute minority
influence in the electoral process and thereby impair their ability to
achieve representation in the legislature led the courts, in interpret-
ing the Voting Rights Act, to require the creation of single-member
Guinier, supra note 107, at 1092; see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993) (stating that
"[tlhe [Voting Rights] Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access to
the voting booth; by the early 1970's, the spread between black and white registration in several
of the targeted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%.").
109. Studies of at-large election schemes and single-member districts have demonstrated
that minority groups tend to receive less representation under at-large systems. See Barbara L.
Berry & Thomas R. Dye, The Discriminatory Effects of At-Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
85, 121 (1979); Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: Protecting the Rights of Racial and
Language Minorities in the Electoral Process, 13 CHiCANO L. REV. 1, 9 (1993); Richard A.
Walawender, Note, At-large Elections and Vote Dilution: An Empirical Study, 19 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORm 1221, 1233 (1986).
110. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 102, at 589-90.
111. For example, in Bessemer, Alabama, where an at-large election kept the near black
majority from electing a black official to the city council, a civil rights leader noted, "[bilacks
have lost hope for representation. Apathy has set in. The feeling of hopelessness is well
ingrained." Howard Ball, The Perpetuation of Racial Vote Dilution: An Examination of Some
Constraints on the Effective Administration of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, As Amended in 1982,
28 How. L.J. 433,462 (1985) (citation omitted).
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electoral districts.112 Single-member districting facilitates the repre-
sentation of minority groups by limiting the constituency for each seat
in the legislature to circumscribed areas in which such groups, though
a minority in the jurisdiction as a whole, comprise a majority of the
district and, therefore, can elect a candidate of their choice.11s Tn
many cities, particularly larger ones, different groups defined by vari-
ous demographic characteristics, such as class, political affiliation, oc-
cupation, religion, ethnicity, and race, occupy different identifiable ar-
eas."4 Indeed, historically-determined "hyper-segregation""15 has left
whole areas of some cities almost exclusively one race, while other
neighborhoods may be occupied predominantly by members of par-
ticular ethnic or cultural groups by choice. Thus, by building on resi-
dential patterns, single-member districting facilitates the representa-
tion of minority groups, racial and otherwise, in the legislative proc-
ess. These race-conscious efforts to maximize minority representation
112. See Guinier, supra note 107, at 1094-1100 (discussing how courts interpreted 1982
amendments to Voting Rights Act as authorizing courts to require single-member districts as a
remedy to vote dilution).
113. See Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Participation and
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 469 (1988) (explaining that "courts or
districting authorities often create a series of single member districts, one or more of which
includes a minority population so large that it is virtually assured of electing representatives of
its choice"); Guinier, supra note 102, at 1100 (discussing judicial remedy of subdividing
jurisdiction into small single-member districts in which a majority is black, thereby enabling
blacks to control the election of the district's representative).
114. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156 (1971) (observing that "[there are also
union-oriented workers, the university community, religious or ethnic groups occupying
identifiable areas of our heterogeneous cities and urban areas."); see also infra notes 14142 and
accompanying text.
115. The term "hypersegregation" was coined by Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton
and refers to the extreme levels of racial segregation that exist in various large U.S. metropoli-
tan areas. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCYA. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 74-77 (1993). Nancy Denton explains the phenomenon as
follows:
By hypersegregation we mean that no matter how one conceptualizes segregation,
African-Americans score very high: they are unevenly distributed across neighborhoods;
they are highly isolated within very racially homogenous neighborhoods; their neighbor-
hoods are clustered to form contiguous ghettoes, centralized near central business dis-
tricts and away from suburban schools and jobs, and concentrated in terms of population
density and spatial area compared to white neighborhoods. Together, these five con-
cepts (evenness, isolation, clustering, centralization, and concentration) comprise five
distinct dimensions of segregation.
Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential Segregation and
School Segregation, 80 MANN. L. REV. 795, 798 (1996); see also Paul A. Jargowsky, Metropolitan
Restructuring and Urban Policy, STAN. L. & POLY REV., Summer 1997, at 47, 48 (observing that
"[in the three decades since the passage of landmark civil rights and fair housing legislation,
racial segregation between blacks and whites in U.S. metropolitan areas has remained ex-
tremely high.") (citations omitted).
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through districting, however, raise constitutional questions of their
own.
C. Districting for Minority Representation Meets Equal Protection:
The "Communities of Interest" Synthesis
As in the jury context, equal protection concerns over the use
of race have jeopardized race-conscious efforts to increase minority
participation in the electoral process. In Shaw v. Reno"6 and Miller v.
Johnson,117 the Supreme Court recognized a new cause of action under
the Equal Protection Clause against electoral districting schemes.
The Court held that districting plans that rely predominantly on race
must satisfy the requirements of strict scrutiny."8 The novelty in the
ruling was the invocation of strict scrutiny, with its usual fatal conse-
quences, even though no racial group had had its voting strength di-
luted by the districting plan. The plans at issue were race-consciously
designed to create majority-minority districts whose percentage
among the total number of districts approached the percentage of mi-
nority persons among the total population of the state."9 The chal-
lengers, who happened to be white, 20 were harmed, the Court held, by
being subject to a districting plan that was predominantly motivated
by racial considerations. As a consequence, majority-minority dis-
tricts created for the purpose of enhancing minority participation in
the electoral process became vulnerable, and many such districts have
been successfully challenged in court.' 2'
In lieu of districting primarily on behalf of racial groups, the
Court endorsed the creation of districts around "communities of inter-
est." 22 What the Court means by communities of interest is not en-
tirely clear. The Court seems to have in mind a geographically-identi-
fiable community the majority of which share political interests. In
identifying such communities, the Court permits the consideration of
116. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
117. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
118. See id. at 916 (holding that strict scrutiny is triggered when race has been
predominant factor in drawing district lines); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643 (holding that strict scrutiny
is triggered when district's design is unexplainable on grounds other than race).
119. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 900, 905; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633-34.
120. The harm recognized by the Court did not turn on the race of the plaintiffs, so in that
sense, their race was irrelevant. Given their opposition to districts in which blacks comprised a
majority, however, their race would seem to have obvious explanatory force.
121. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 976-81 (1996) (invalidating Texas legislative
districts); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904-18 (1996) (invalidating North Carolina congressional
districting plan); Miller, 515 U.S. at 920-27 (invalidating Georgia congressional districting plan).
122. See supra note 23 for cases in which the Supreme Court has used the term
"communities of interest" in the context of electoral districting.
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various demographic characteristics, including "traditional districting
principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political
subdivisions," and other indicia of shared interest such as political af-
filiation, socioeconomic status, religion, or occupation.2 3
Race is also a factor that district line-drawers may consider in
identifying communities of interest.2 4 Contrary to many media re-
ports,2 5 and some scholarly commentary, 26 the Court has not fore-
closed completely the use of race in electoral districting. Instead, race
may be used as one of several demographic factors to identify commu-
nities of interest for inclusion within particular districts to facilitate
the representation of such communities in the electoral process. If
race is only one factor, and not predominant over others, race-con-
scious districting plans do not even trigger strict scrutiny. 27
The Court's "communities of interest" approach raises two
questions with respect to the use of race in drawing electoral district
lines: Why did the Court limit the extent to which race may be relied
upon, and why does the Court still permit some consideration of race?
With respect to its limitation on the use of race, the Court seemed
concerned about the message conveyed by race-conscious districting.
Likening the appearance of districts drawn with obvious reliance on
race to "political apartheid," 28 the Court condemned such districts as
reflecting impermissible stereotyping. 29 Given that the invalidated
district caused no vote dilution, the nature of the constitutional injury
was unclear. According to Professors Pildes and Niemi, the Court was
concerned with "expressive harms"10 from state actions that reflect a
123. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646.
124. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 920 (explaining that state may "recognize communities that
have a particular racial makeup, provided its action is directed toward some common thread of
relevant interests," but where, as here, state relies on race as the predominant, overriding
factor over other districting principles, strict scrutiny must be satisfied).
125. See supra note 24.
126. See supra note 25.
127. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
128. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
129. According to the Court, "where the State assumes from a group of voters' race that
they 'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls,' it engages in racial stereotyping at odds with equal protection mandates." Miller, 515
U.S. at 920 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647).
130. "An expressive harm," Pildes and Niemi write, "is one that results from the ideas or
attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or
material consequences the action brings about. On this view, the meaning of a governmental
action is just as important as what that action does. Public policies can violate the Constitution
not only because they bring about concrete costs, but because the very meaning they convey
demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public values." Richard H. Pildes & Richard G.
Niemi, Expressive Harms, 'Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483, 506-07 (1993).
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form of value reductionism, i.e., an overemphasis of one value (here
race) over other equally important values (other indicia of shared in-
terest), in a context in which the Constitution "require[s] policymak-
ers to accommodate and sustain the tension between conflicting val-
ues, rather than to permit one important value to subordinate all oth-
ers."131 Alternatively, Professors Aleinikoff and Issacharoff suggest,
the Court's concern over racially-motivated districts stems from a re-
jection of race "essentialism," i.e., the assumption that voters share
the same interests simply on the basis of race. 1 2 "To fashion public
programs on the belief that all African Americans or Latinos or
women have identical preferences and outlooks is to make a factual
and moral error; it is to deny a basic, individualistic premise of the
American creed."
33
In addition to the invidious message conveyed by racially ger-
rymandered districts, the Court was troubled by what it perceived as
the potential effects of such districts on racial politics. First, by per-
petuating the stereotype that members of the same racial group, re-
gardless of other differences, share political interests, racial gerry-
mandering may balkanize people along racial lines and exacerbate
patterns of racial bloc voting."3 Second, the Court stated that racial
gerrymandering may encourage elected officials to view their primary
obligation as representing one racial group to the exclusion of other
constituents. 3 5
That these concerns would prompt the Court to limit the use of
race is unsurprising. An intriguing question, however, is why, in view
of these concerns, the Court did not forbid completely the use of race
in drawing district lines. Indeed, in criticizing the racially gerryman-
dered districts it invalidated in Shaw and Miller, the Court con-
demned the use of race in the strongest terms and cited an array of
precedents in which any use of race was held to be inherently sus-
pect.3 ' The Court has been remarkably unclear why the use of race
as one of many factors is permissible in electoral districting without
triggering strict scrutiny."37 Recounting the nature and purpose of
districting, however, suggests some plausible explanations.
131. Id. at 506.
132. Aleinikoff& Issacharoff, supra note 102, at 615.
133. Id. (citation omitted).
134. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 642-44; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904-05 (1995).
137. What is particularly confusing about the Court's reasoning in Miller is that, while the
Court begins by explaining that the Equal Protection Clause's ban on race-based decision-
making applies to districting just as it does in other contexts, Miller, 515 U.S. at 911-13, the
384 [Vol. 52:353
JURAL DISTRICTING
I submit that one important justification for treating race-con-
scious electoral districting differently from most other race-conscious
state action rests on the distinction between the use of race to ensure
minority access to governing institutions and its use by such institu-
tions in defining substantive choices. Generally, the democratic proc-
ess is to be relied upon to define the content of legislative policies.
However, the intentional use of race in fashioning such policies in-
creases the risk that the interests of racial minorities will be under-
valued or denigrated. Only if the use of race can be justified as neces-
sary to achieve a compelling interest will that risk be tolerated. By
contrast, the use of race to ensure minority representation in the gov-
erning process itself may enhance the reliability of the process to give
equal concern to minority interests over procedures that avoid racial
considerations. At-large electoral systems, for example, may preclude
effective representation of minority groups even when such systems
are created for race-neutral reasons. Similarly, single-member dis-
tricting that ignores racial demographics may dilute minority repre-
sentation by inadvertently "packing" such groups into particular dis-
tricts or distributing them throughout several districts and thereby
preventing them from forming a majority in any district. Of course,
not every use of race in districting is legitimate. Excessive reliance on
race may carry certain risks, as discussed above.138 Obviously, the use
of race to exclude minority participation from the electoral process is
impermissible. The use of race as one of several factors to enhance
minority participation, however, may serve the ends of representative
democracy and equal protection at least as, and possibly more, effec-
tively than electoral districting without regard to race.
Court then proceeds to hold that strict scrutiny is triggered when race has been the
predominant, overriding factor in a district's design, id, at 916. In other contexts, however,
strict scrutiny is triggered when race is a motivating factor even if it is not the predominant
factor. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977), cited in Miller, 515 U.S. at 905. Professors Karlan and Levinson note the Court's
continuing failure to clarify the test for when strict scrutiny applies to a racially-motivated
districting plan:
This Term's attempt at a further gloss on when strict scrutiny is required, Bush v. Vera,
fizzled miserably, producing no majority opinion, two somewhat contradictory opinions
each written by Justice O'Connor, and a deeply divided Court on which four Justices
called for the overruling of the entire line of wrongful districting cases. All that seems
clear is that Justice O'Connor is the pivotal voter and that district appearance-a factor
seemingly irreducible to any easy to articulate or to apply set of rules-is the key to her
approach.
Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1215
(1996).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 128-35.
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Some scholars have advanced an alternative justification for
permitting the use of race in electoral districting while prohibiting its
use in other contexts, namely, that districting is inherently concerned
with the identification of groups rather than individuals. 9 The rep-
resentation of groups requires a choice of characteristics in order to
identify or define which groups to aggregate into districts. Given the
prevalence in this society of racial discrimination, racial bloc voting,
residential segregation, and the myriad of associations self-defined by
race, it is realistic, not stereotypical, to assume that race is a charac-
teristic with respect to which many people either identify and form
communities or at least have interests or experiences in common as a
result of a shared racial identity. Use of race in electoral districting,
particularly when combined with other indicia of shared interest,
would be useful for identifying such communities. In addition to ra-
cial communities, however, districting would also aggregate non-ra-
cial communities of interest defined wholly by demographic factors
other than race that reside within a jurisdiction. To preclude the use
of race while permitting the use of other criteria in identifying com-
munities of interest would enable such other communities to seek
representation in the legislature while denying that opportunity to
racial minorities.14° The use of race in electoral districting is thus
necessary for racial minorities-as groups-to have access to the leg-
islative process equal to that of nonminority groups.
The next question is what effect the Court's "communities of
interest" approach to electoral districting will have on the representa-
tive character of legislatures. The Court's approach limits the extent
to which the electoral process will predictably produce racially diverse
legislatures, at least on the federal and state level. Notwithstanding
the persistence of racially segregated communities, the large size of
congressional districts and, to a lesser degree, state legislative dis-
tricts, makes the possibility of creating majority-minority districts dif-
139. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 102, at 600-01 (arguing that fairness of
electoral system cannot be evaluated without reference to group rights); Karlan & Levinson,
supra note 137, at 1204-08 (noting that the purpose of apportionment is to classify voters into
groups to elect "representatives").
140. As Karlan and Levinson observe:
In apportionments... the alternative to race-conscious districting is not to treat indi-
viduals as individuals, but rather to use some other demographic characteristics as an
aggregating tool.... [A] command that forbids using race, but permits use of these
other characteristics has the perverse consequence of discriminating against the in-
tended beneficiaries of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. If only race is ex-
cluded from the political calculus of redistricting, then only black and Hispanic voices
will be excluded from the process of governance.
Karlan & Levinson, supra note 137, at 1208 (footnotes omitted).
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ficult without substantial reliance on race. The limitation on race-
conscious districting would, however, likely have less impact on local
elections for city or county councils, where relatively small districts or
wards enable the creation of districts around compact communities of
a distinctive character. Still, the inability to focus on race above all
else surely limits the extent to which districting would achieve racial
diversity.
Although racial representation is less easily achieved under
the Court's approach, districting around geographically-identifiable
communities of interest may nonetheless advance the cause of legisla-
tive representativeness. Communities of interest may be at least as
good a proxy as race alone in identifying groups with distinct perspec-
tives and experiences. For example, a black resident of a middle-class
neighborhood may be more likely to share experiences and interests
in common with another black person from the same neighborhood
than with a black person from the inner city. Indeed, the black resi-
dent of the middle-class neighborhood may well have more interests
in common with a white neighbor with respect to, for example, com-
munity policing, public schools, or welfare, than with the black inner-
city resident. Thus, although defining political groups by race alone
may be adequate to capture a substantial amount of shared interests,
using race in combination with other indicia of community, including
residential proximity, may more effectively capture a more homoge-
nous community.
Moreover, to the extent that communities of interest exist
whose identities are defined by traits other than race, such as relig-
ion, class, age, occupation or political affiliation, districting can enable
these communities to seek representation in the legislature as well.
For example, districts may be drawn around a Hasidic Jewish com-
munity,'4 ' a retirement village, a Catholic enclave, or around other
communities occupied by "union oriented workers, the university
community, [or] religious or ethnic groups occupying identifiable ar-
eas of our heterogeneous cities and urban areas."42 By encompassing
such communities within the same district and leaving other commu-
nities for other districts, the membership of the legislature would
tend to represent many of the various communities residing through-
out a jurisdiction.
My point here is not to praise the recent restraints imposed
upon electoral districting under Shaw and Miller, although I have
141. See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
142. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156 (1971).
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suggested some potential justifications. The passionate debate that
has ensued since these decisions suggests a great deal of complexity
in the issue. My point is that despite the limitations placed upon
race-conscious districting designed to enhance minority representa-
tion, districting, with an eye toward, communities of interest, remains
a viable strategy for increasing the representative character of the
legislative process. Whether such a strategy is worth pursuing in the
context of jury selection is the question addressed in the next Part.
IV. JURAL DISTRICTING: APPLYING ELECTORAL DISTRICTING
PRINCIPLES TO THE SELECTION OF JURIES
Like legislators prior to electoral districting, jurors are selected
on an at-large basis under current selection procedures. That is, ju-
rors are generally drawn randomly from any location within a jury
district without regard to whether other jurors selected for the same
trial are drawn from the same area. By simple chance, the jury panel
selected for any particular trial may contain several jurors from par-
ticular areas within the district and none from other areas. In this
way, the at-large nature of current selection procedures inevitably
leads to the selection of juries that alternatively overrepresent and
underrepresent the communities within the district. The smaller a
community within the district is, the more likely an at-large selection
process will, through chance, fail to select a member of that commu-
nity to serve on the petit jury of any particular case.
At-large selection procedures also reinforce other factors that
lead to the under-selection of minority persons (such as underrepre-
sentative source lists and lower response rates), by over-selecting
residents of non-minority communities to fill jury seats that would
otherwise be filled by members of minority communities if the selec-
tion process were more inclusive.'43 The effect of districting in the
electoral process to ensure better representation of geographically-
identifiable communities suggests its potential use to remedy the un-
derrepresentation effects of at-large selection procedures in the jury
selection process.
143. For an explanation of the relationship between at-large selection procedures and other
race-neutral factors that contribute to the underrepresentation of minority groups on juries, see
infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
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The following discussion begins with a "strict" model of jural
districting that closely parallels electoral districting.144 In this way,
the potential advantages and pitfalls of applying districting principles
to jury selection can be highlighted. Some modifications that retain
many of the advantages offered by districting while mnimizing some
of its potential limitations are considered later.
145
A. Jural Districting and Its Implications for Jury Representativeness
Under a strict model of jural districting, a jury district would
be divided into twelve146 sub-districts of approximately equal popula-
tion. Each petit jury would be required to contain one juror from each
sub-district. Sub-districts would be drawn with a view toward includ-
ing communities of interest within particular sub-districts.
Demographic information used to identify such communities would,
as in the electoral context, include governmental unit boundaries as
well as other demographic factors such as race, religion, occupation,
class, and other information that electoral district line-drawers use to
identify communities of interest.
Compared to current at-large selection methods, jural district-
ing would tend to create juries more representative of the surround-
ing vicinage by ensuring that each jury contains residents of different
sub-districts encompassing different communities of interest. As elec-
toral districting experience informs us, residents of different commu-
nities of interest tend to differ more from each other than would resi-
dents of the same community. Because persons of similar demograph-
ics tend to concentrate in certain areas, geographical diversity would
tend to yield demographic diversity. Under current at-large jury se-
lection, a jury may contain several jurors from the same community,
144. The "strict" model of jural districting is described at the outset of Part IV_.A By
"strict," I mean a model of selecting a jury through a districting system that closely tracks
electoral districting principles. Most importantly, a strict model would require that each and
every jury contain one juror from each sub-district within a jury district just as a legislature
elected through a districting scheme would contain a legislator elected to represent each
district. Another important feature of a strict model ofjural districting is the use of the same
demographic data that electoral districters use including the use of race as one of many factors.
Ajurisdiction may wish to relax or modify some of the features of a strict model ofjural district-
ing, which is explored infra Part IV.B.
145. See infra Part 1V.B.
146. The number twelve is only relevant for courts with twelve-member criminal juries, as
was conventional at common law and continues to be in the federal system. States requiring
fewer jurors, such as eight or ten, would, under a strict jural districting model, sub-divide the
district into eight or ten sub-districts respectively and require every petit jury in a criminal case
to contain a juror from each sub-district.
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where residents tend to share common backgrounds and experiences,
while containing no jurors from other communities where residents
have different backgrounds. Under jural districting, each juror on
every jury would come from a different sub-district and community,
creating a greater likelihood that a jury would encompass a range of
different experiences and perspectives.
Perhaps even more significant than counteracting the under-
representative effect that random at-large selection inevitably has on
particular jury panels, jural districting would also counteract those
other features of jury selection that tend to underselect minority
groups, such as underinclusive source lists, qualification standards,
and the financial hardship of jury service. 147 These features of jury
selection currently result in the overall underrepresentation of minor-
ity groups in jury service. Under jural districting, in contrast, if a
disproportionately low percentage of residents from certain minority
communities are selected for jury service, such communities would
still be represented proportionally on juries because jural districting
would require that someone from the sub-district circumscribing that
community serve on each jury. The result would be that residents of
"low turnout" minority communities who do serve on juries would do
so more frequently than would residents from communities where a
high percentage of residents serve. Jural districting would thus help
to ensure the proportional representation of different communities
throughout a jury district even if a lower percentage of residents of
some communities perform jury service.
Turning once again to the electoral context, this effect of jural
districting in compensating for the low selection rates of certain mi-
nority communities is analogous to the effect of electoral districting in
compensating for low voter turnout in minority communities. 148 As
discussed previously, a minority community suffers in an at-large
electoral system because the voters of that community can be out-
147. For a description of selection procedures that, though race-neutral, contribute to the
underrepresentation of minority groups on juries, see supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
148. A minority community with low voter turnout can, through districting, still control the
election of a candidate when a single-member district is designed so that the minority commu-
nity is a substantial majority of the district's population. See Adam J. Chill, The Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments with Respect to the Voting Franchise: A Constitutional Quandary, 25
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 645, 678 & n.178 (1992) (explaining that safe minority-majority
districts can be created even for minority communities with particularly low voter turnout if the
minority community is made to represent a super-majority (75 percent) of the population of the
district); Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 902 & n.119
(1995) (explaining that in order to compensate for low minority voter turnout, "safe" majority-




voted by voters from other communities. A minority community with
low voter turnout will be outnumbered by an even larger margin.
When, through electoral districting, a minority community is made a
substantial majority within a given district, then that community can
control the election of a representative from that district even when
voter turnout is relatively low. This consequence is largely praised as
compensating for lower voter turnout in minority communities that
may reflect apathy or distrust on the part of these communities whose
interests have been underrepresented in the past and would, absent
districting, continue to be underrepresented in the present. Similarly,
jural districting would help to compensate for the lower response and
qualification rates of traditionally underrepresented minority
communities. The message of desired inclusion sent by jural
districting, moreover, may help to reverse the sense of alienation from
the criminal justice system felt in such communities. True, some
residents of underrepresented communities might value enhanced
political power over more frequent jury service, but the point remains
that jural districting would tend to create juries that are more
representative than juries selected under current at-large methods.
The jury system would benefit from the enhanced decision-making
and legitimacy that derives from such representation.
Consider also the potentially beneficial effect of jural district-
ing on the peremptory challenge. The contribution of the peremptory
challenge to the underrepresentation of minority groups is well docu-
mented and even more well known among court reformers concerned
with jury representativeness. 149 Jural districting could minimize the
use of the peremptory challenge to exclude members of racial and
ethnic groups from jury service. First, one may reasonably anticipate
that a jurisdiction adopting jural districting would also limit the
number of peremptory challenges. A jurisdiction willing to adminis-
ter jural districting, with its attendant costs, 150 is probably one in
which current selection procedures underrepresent certain minority
groups, such as racial minorities, to an intolerable degree. These
same concerns over underrepresentative juries would probably moti-
vate such a jurisdiction to seriously consider reducing or eliminating
the peremptory challenge. Second, even if peremptory challenges
were retained, by requiring a juror from every sub-district, jural dis-
tricting could help to deter abuses and the underrepresentative effect
of the peremptory challenge. A litigant with a limited number of such
149. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also King, supra note 10, at 718 & n.33.
150. For a discussion of potential costs ofjural districting, see infra Part IV.B.
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challenges may hesitate to employ them based on overbroad or invidi-
ous racial group stereotypes when the struck juror will likely be re-
placed by a juror from the same community. Thus, although jural dis-
tricting is compatible with existing peremptory challenge practice, it
creates a lower likelihood that the practice will be used to undermine
the representative character of the jury.
Jural districting also compares favorably with the use of racial
quotas. True, jural districting would tend to be less effective in creat-
ing racially representative juries than would racial quotas. However,
to the extent that racial segregation persists in many cities, district-
ing would still achieve some racial diversity. Moreover, the kind of
racial diversity created through districting may be more meaningful
than diversity created by the use of racial quotas. As discussed in the
context of electoral districting, the difference between persons of dif-
ferent races selected from different communities of interest would
tend to be greater than the difference between persons of different
races selected on the basis of race alone. Indeed, jurors who share the
same racial identity but reside in different communities may differ as
much and possibly more from one another than jurors whose only
known difference is race and who live in the same community. In
sum, while the use of race as a proxy for juror difference is rational
given the significant correlation between race and certain experiences
in this country, it is probably a less effective proxy than community of
interest. Jurors who may differ racially but who have several demo-
graphic traits in common such as place of residence and economic
class may have as much or more in common in terms of experiences
and perspectives that bear on juror performance than would jurors of
the same race who differ along these demographic lines.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, the use of racial quotas raises
very serious constitutional difficulties. The use of race in identifying
communities of interest for jury selection would not, however, seem to
implicate the same concerns. Given the Court's acquiescence to the
use of race in drawing district lines around communities of interest in
the electoral process, 151 the same use of race in drawing district lines
for the purpose of jury selection should be equally tolerable. In both
the legislative and jury contexts, the state has a legitimate interest in
devising procedures that facilitate the representation of diverse
groups residing throughout the respective jurisdictions. Such repre-
151. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 916 (1995) (explaining that strict scrutiny is triggered when race is used as an overriding
and predominant factor as opposed to one factor among many).
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sentativeness may positively affect the substantive decisions reached
by the respective bodies, enhance their political legitimacy as demo-
cratic institutions, and provide a valuable educative function through
the participation of members of the various groups included in the
process. Districting around communities of interest, though not re-
quired in either context, represents a viable means for facilitating the
representation of cognizable communities in the respective institu-
tions. There seems to be no meaningful difference between the use of
race in identifying communities of interest for drawing electoral dis-
trict lines and the use of race in identifying communities of interest
for drawing jural district lines. In the electoral context, members of
communities of interest defined in part by race are assumed to share
the types of experiences, perspectives, and values that influence one's
evaluation of political issues. In the jury context, members of the
same communities are assumed to share the types of experiences,
perspectives, and values that influence one's evaluation of evidentiary
issues. It is difficult to see why this assumption about the jury con-
text would represent an invidious or illegitimate stereotype when the
assumption underlying electoral districting does not. Therefore, the
Court should permit the limited use of race in jural districting with-
out triggering strict scrutiny as it does in electoral districting.
In addition to its implications for racial diversity, jural district-
ing would also likely achieve greater representation of communities
defined by traits other than race as compared with both current selec-
tion methods and racial quotas. Although discussions of jury repre-
sentativeness have tended to focus on the underrepresentation of ra-
cial minorities (and racial majorities in the O.J. Simpson criminal
trial) commentators have also expressed concern over selection meth-
ods, such as the peremptory challenge, that compose juries that un-
derrepresent people defined by demographic traits in addition to race,
such as occupation, education, religion, or class.1 2 To the extent that
152. See Joseph T. Clark, The "Community Standard" in the Trial of Obscenity Cases-A
Mandate for Empirical Evidence in Search of the Truth, 20 OHmo N.U. L. REV. 13, 22-23 (1993)
(lamenting that "statistics suggest that juries are rarely composed of representatives of all
groups of the community," and that juries tend to underrepresent young persons, minorities,
women, the highly educated, as well as "members of the police and fire departments, public
officials, members of the armed services, physicians, lawyers, dentists, and the elderly");
Stephanie Domitrovich, Jury Source Lists and the Community's Need to Achieve Racial Balance
on the Jury, 33 DuQ. L. REV. 39, 88 (1994) (raising concern that source lists based on voter
registration records "tend[ ] to underrepresent minorities, the poor, the young, the elderly and
the less educated and tend[ ] to overrepresent Caucasians, the middle-aged and those who are
better educated"); Christopher E. Smith, Imagery, Politics, and Jury Reform, 28 AKRON L. REV.
77, 92-93 (1994) (questioning value of peremptory challenge given its use to exclude young
persons, the poor, and racial minorities from juries); Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury,
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people who share such demographic traits are concentrated in par-
ticular communities, jural districting would tend to enhance the rep-
resentation of these groups as well. In this way, jural districting
would help to ensure that juries generally represent a broad cross-
section of the community. Such broad diversity, including but not
limited to racial or ethnic diversity, should enhance the quality and
legitimacy of the jury system over both current at-large procedures
and proposals that rely predominantly on race. 153
Finally, with its focus on residential communities, jural dis-
tricting would tend to enhance the jury's collective knowledge with
respect to the character of different neighborhoods. Issues, such as
the reasonableness of the defendant's or the police's conduct, can be
better understood when the jury has some sense of the character of
the neighborhood in which the crime was allegedly committed or the
suspect apprehended.'5 In some relatively quiet and safe neighbor-
hoods, for example, a loud exchange on a street corner, carrying a
weapon, or fleeing from approaching police, may reasonably be viewed
as behavior warranting police inquiry. By contrast, in neighborhoods
characterized by loud bars, loitering gangs, and frequent violent alter-
cations, carrying a weapon may reflect common sense self-protection,
and running from the police may represent a rational attempt to
avoid unjustified harassment.15 5 Consider a case involving allegations
The Jury's Capacity to Decide Complex Civil Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1492 n.16 (1997)
(noting concern that juries in long complex civil trials were more likely to include jurors who are
unmarried, unemployed, or retired, and less likely to be college-educated than juries in shorter
trials).
153. For a discussion of the benefits of broadly representative juries, see supra Part HA.
154. Several scholars have noted the significance of a neighborhood's character in explain-
ing and assessing investigatory practices by police. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the
Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 222 n.42 (1983) (noting some limited judicial
concern that "police attribute too much weight to a high crime neighborhood setting, sometimes
detaining a suspect for mere residence in a ghetto."); id. ("If an honest citizen resides in a
neighborhood heavily populated by criminals, just as the chances are high that he might be one,
so too are the chances high that he might be mistaken for one.... Thus, behavior which seems
'reasonable' to the police because of the character of the neighborhood is seen by the honest
citizen in it as irresponsible and unreasonable. About him, more errors will necessarily be made
under a 'reasonableness' standard." (quoting J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRnAL 218 (2d ed.
1975))); Tracey Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from the Backseat of a Police Squad Car:
Tempered Zeal by H. Richard Uviller, 70 B.U. L. REV. 543, 561-62 (1990) (arguing that "the
criminal character of a neighborhood will always be a factor in assessing police conduct").
155. See Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment
Seriously, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 723, 747 n.110 (1992) (criticizing Justice Scalia's assumption, in
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1991), that flight from police indicates guilt,
because black youths in many communities might reasonably avoid the police for other reasons).
See generally Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The
Gradual but Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOw. L.J. 567 (1991) (describing how police
often subject blacks to unsupported searches and seizures).
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of excessive and/or racially-motivated police conduct. Jurors assess-
ing such allegations will inevitably draw on their own experience with
the police in their own neighborhoods. The inclusion of a variety of
neighborhood experiences on a jury should contribute to its overall
knowledge of what may have happened and ultimately of what did
happen.
In sum, to the extent that different communities of interest re-
side throughout the entire area from which a jury is drawn, jural dis-
tricting would tend to result in juries more consistently representa-
tive of the area in contrast to current at-large methods that permit
the selection of jurors from the same community and none from oth-
ers. Given the reality that members of particular racial or ethnic mi-
nority groups often reside within geographically-identifiable commu-
nities, jural districting would tend to enhance the racial or ethnic di-
versity of juries when sub-districts are drawn to encompass these
communities of interest. In addition to racial diversity, the diversity
achieved through jural districting would bring a broader range of
backgrounds and experiences to the jury room, including people from
communities defined largely by class, age, occupation, religion, or po-
litical affiliation. Representativeness in this broader sense-a sense
which the Court seems prepared to endorse-should enhance the
legitimacy of the criminal jury over both current selection procedures
and methods that would rely predominantly on race.
B. Potential Concerns and Modifications
1. Would Jurors Unduly Perceive Themselves As
"Representatives" of Their Communities?
Even if the kind of diversity that jural districting would
achieve is desirable, there may be harmful effects on juror self-percep-
tions when such diversity is achieved intentionally. Such a procedure
may encourage jurors to think of themselves as advocates for their
communities, potentially compromising the impartiality of jury delib-
erations. The analogy to legislative districting may be particularly
troublesome along these lines.
Legislators are expected to be advocates for the desires of their
constituents. Jurors, by contrast, are expected to be impartial, reach-
ing conclusions based solely on the evidence before them-albeit
viewed through the lenses of their personal experiences and values.
They are not, nor should they be, properly concerned with the wishes
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of their communities with respect to the cases before them. To the ex-
tent districting might encourage jurors to act as advocates for their
communities, the ideal of impartial group deliberations may be re-
placed by a type of interest-group politics. In fact, similar concerns
have been raised with respect to racial quotas, in the sense that jurors
selected through such schemes may perceive themselves as the
"____-race" juror and believe they should decide the case based on
that role.156
The risk of juror partisanship is a real concern and one that
cannot easily be measured or predicted. There may be reasons, how-
ever, to doubt its significance. First, the selection procedure might be
administered so as to minimize the likelihood that jurors would be
aware that they were selected from a particular sub-district or com-
munity. It may be feasible to devise selection procedures to avoid
identifying jurors publicly as members of particular sub-districts, al-
though the court and the litigants would presumably have that infor-
mation. As individual jurors were seated, selection would continue to
include only those jurors in the venire from sub-districts not repre-
sented by seated jurors. It must be acknowledged, however, that such
concealment could only go so far. New selection procedures would
presumably be a matter of public record, available to the media or in-
terest groups that could disseminate the information to the public. In
addition, jurors may inadvertently learn of their sub-district status
during the course of selection or trial proceedings.
Assuming many jurors will know of the districting procedure,
it is still questionable whether their "identity" as a sub-district repre-
sentative is likely to exert significant pressure on their self-percep-
tions. This is not to suggest that community residence has no correla-
tion to juror experience and perspectives; jural districting is premised
on such differences. Rather, the point is that residential community
membership is generally not perceived as an identity with particular
divisiveness in our society. People routinely associate and cooperate
with people from other communities without significant cultural or
social friction. People also generally choose their residential commu-
nity and can, through a change of residence, relocate to a different
community if they choose. The transiency and lack of divisiveness as-
156. See Andrew G. Deiss, Negotiating Justice: The Criminal Trial Jury in a Pluralist
America, 3 U. CHi. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 323, 326 (1996) (stating that "(p]erhaps the most com-
mon criticism of the use of racial quotas injury selection is that it will transform the jury from a
'deliberative' body focused on ferreting out the facts of crime into a body in which jurors
'represent' their racial constituency, a body in which jurors might just as well mail in their
verdict' ") (footnotes omitted).
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sociated with community residence lies in contrast to the divisive sig-
nificance of race in America. This racial divisiveness, as previously
discussed, underlies the Court's preference for community-of-interest
districting over "racial gerrymandering," and raises concerns over jury
selection procedures based on racial quotas.
Two examples may illustrate the point. First, consider the
current controversy over affirmative action in college admissions.
Many colleges, including those under attack for using racial prefer-
ences, currently have and continue to seek geographic diversity in
their student population by giving preference to underrepresented
counties or states. 157 Yet these preferences are not viewed with the
same hostility as racial preferences, even when they serve as compa-
rable proxies for diversity of experience. Second, and returning to the
jury context, consider how court watchers and the public are much
more likely to comment on the racial composition of the jury than the
residential communities in which individual jurors live.158
Thus, while some risk undoubtedly exists that jurors selected
through jural districting will perceive their role, at least initially, as
related to their community identity, the relatively mild non-divisive
significance of residential identity, at least as compared to racial iden-
tity, will minimize the risk that a juror will decide that, because his
community of residence played a role in his selection, he has an obli-
gation to dig in and fight for a verdict that he imagines his community
would prefer notwithstanding that the juror personally would con-
sider alternative views of the case.
Even assuming some effect on juror self-perception from jural
districting, the role expected of them as jurors and the effect of the de-
liberative process would likely negate any impression that they
should represent their communities. A legislator advocates for the
interests of her district not just because she lives there, but because
157. See Bruce Goldner, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1303 (1992) (reviewing Dinesh D'Souza) (stating that "universities routinely
lower standards for applicants from less represented states to achieve geographic diversity");
Lucy Katz, Public Affirmative Action and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Fragmentation of
Theory After Richmond v. J-4- Croson Co. and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 317, 330 n.65 (1992) (stating that
"[u]nder the Harvard University affirmative action plan, race, ethnicity and economic diversity
could be considered as a factor in admissions, together with geographic diversity and 'life spent
on a farm' in order to create a diverse student body").
158. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 & n.1 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting how much public believes the racial makeup of a jury matters and citing evidence on
how frequently the media emphasizes the number of blacks and whites on criminal juries);




she knows it is her job to represent her district and she knows that
keeping her job depends on it. In contrast, a juror performs a very
different role, and one which evidence shows most jurors take quite
seriously.15 She is expected to listen to and follow the court's instruc-
tions, which include setting aside pre-conceived views about the case,
and to evaluate the evidence accordingly. Her performance in a case
is not evaluated, if at all, by how well she represented her commu-
nity's interests; nor does her employment as a juror in future cases,
assuming she wants it, depend on the court's or her community's per-
ception of how well she represented her community.160
Finally, any self-perceived role as community representative
that might remain after sitting through a trial and listening to the
court's instructions may dissipate during the deliberative process in
the jury room. We should remember that even jurors selected
through current at-large schemes will often approach a case from dif-
ferent perspectives from one another. We cannot realistically expect
that any jury selection method will create objective or impartial jurors
in an absolute sense, or that they will "come into the jury box and
leave behind all that their human experience has taught them." 6'
Indeed, a principal reason for seeking representative juries is that we
recognize that jurors, particularly jurors from different cognizable
groups, may have had markedly different life experiences and will, at
least initially, draw different inferences and conclusions about the
same factual and legal issues in a case. Notwithstanding the inevita-
ble differences in backgrounds and viewpoints among jurors, we ex-
pect them, through deliberation, to learn from each other, including
the weaknesses of pre-conceived biases or assumptions, and eventu-
ally to reach a consensus about the proper verdict to be rendered. The
unanimity required of most criminal jury verdicts further encourages
the jurors to put aside prejudice and narrow group interests in order
to reach a verdict satisfactory to all.162 Jural districting accepts the
159. See Firoz Dattu, Illustrated Jury Instructions: A Proposal, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
67, 68 (1998) (explaining that 'jurors generally take their roles seriously, and try to apply the
law as best they can"); Steven Helle, Publicity Does Not Equal Prejudice, 85 ILL. B.J. 16, 21 n.23
(1997) (explaining that 'jurors take their responsibility seriously; they check prejudices at the
door").
160. As Professor King observes, 'juror 'representatives' are not motivated by the same
incentives as legislators. They are not beholden to 'constituents' for their livelihood or status, or
even for their opportunity to serve on the jury. Their individual preferences and votes may not
even become known." King, supra note 48, at 1199-1200.
161. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980), quoted in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162. Some court reformers advocate eliminating the traditional unanimity verdict rule in
favor of a majority or super-majority rule. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten
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reality that jurors bring different assumptions to the jury room and
seeks to ensure that, through deliberation among a diverse group, fair
and legitimate verdicts are reached. The assumption on the part of
any jurors that they should "represent" their sub-districts or commu-
nities should, as with other inappropriate preconceptions, be aban-
doned through the deliberative process. Thus, to the extent that jural
districting might invite a type of sub-district or community bias with
any lingering effect after trial, such bias, after deliberating awhile,
should have largely dissipated.
Ultimately, the effect of jural districting on juror self-percep-
tions cannot be predicted ex ante and the risk of community advocacy
cannot be dismissed. The preceding discussion noted several points
that suggest this risk may not be great. It should also be noted that
this risk must be compared to those of existing practice rather than to
the ideal of a bias-free jury system. That is, would jural districting
make things worse than they currently are? Presently, jurors may
perceive themselves as representing a certain perspective, such as
class or race-the current system does not preclude this potential.
Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1190 (1995); see also Andrew Blum, A Hostile
Environment for Unanimous Juries?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 11, 1995, at Al; Jason L. Riley, Rule of
Law: Should a Jury Verdict Be Unanimous?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1995, at All. Their propos-
als stem primarily from a concern over hung juries, which are likely to result more frequently
under a unanimity rule. See, e.g., Amar, supra. Unanimity rule proponents, on the other hand,
cite fairness and legitimacy concerns over verdicts, particularly convictions, when some jurors
dissent. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1263-64
(1996); Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward a Defense of the
Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDozo L. REv. 1417 (1997); Christopher E. Smith,
supra note 152; Douglas G. Smith, supra note 4, at 449. In addition, the unanimity rule has
been found to contribute to fuller, more meaningful deliberations. See REID HASTiE ET AL.,
INSIDE THE JURY 229-30 (1983); Arenella, supra; Charlan Nemeth, Interactions Between Jurors
As a Function of Majority vs. Unanimity Decision Rules, 7 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 38 (1977);
Mitchell S. Zuklie, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, 84 CAL. L. REV. 101, 145
(1996).
Analogizing once again to the legislative context may also provide some insights.
Legislatures generally enact legislation on a majority-rule basis. As Professor Guinier observes,
the majority rule that governs legislatures may undermine minority representation because
legislators in a majority can simply ignore the interests of minority legislators. Thus, while the
Voting Rights Act has helped to combat gerrymandering designed to prevent minority groups
from electing candidates to the legislature, the majority rule within the legislature enables
majority legislators to achieve a type of "deliberative gerrymander" by excluding minority
legislators, once elected, from meaningful participation in the law-making process. See Guinier,
supra note 107, at 1126 & n.242. Applying Guinier's reasoning to the jury, a majority verdict
rule would enable jurors in a sufficient majority to ignore the views of minority jurors during
deliberation, and thereby largely negate the value sought by including minority persons on the
jury in the first place. Thus, preserving the unanimity rule may help to ensure that jurors
sincerely deliberate with an open mind instead of engaging in partisan factionalism. In any
event, while I favor preserving the unanimity rule for all the reasons mentioned, that debate is
ultimately outside the scope of this Article in that jural districting is compatible with whatever
verdict rule a jurisdiction wishes to adopt.
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This may be particularly acute when a juror is alone in representing
her group-consider the lone black juror in a racially charged case. 1
63
Litigants can already play the "community card" without jural dis-
tricting as they will often have information about where jurors live.
The sad fact is that the jury room may already be a place of partisan
advocacy and compromise. Jural districting at least takes account of
this risk, and seeks, through roughly proportional inclusion of
competing community values, to reach a compromise that most com-
ports with the judgment of the community as a whole. A candid dis-
cussion about the role of jury compositions and the reality of current
juror practice is certainly warranted, and a debate over jural district-
ing provides a useful occasion.
2. Practical Concerns and Modifications to the Strict Model
of Jural Districting
Several practical concerns may arise over jural districting un-
der the strict model thus far described, the most significant of which
this section will address. First, it could add significant cost to the
jury selection process to require that each juror on every petit jury
come from a different sub-district. Depending on the rate of response
to jury summonses from particular sub-districts, which jurors are ex-
cused for cause or hardship, and which jurors are challenged peremp-
torily, a strict one-juror-per-sub-district requirement could greatly in-
crease the number of jurors that would need to be summoned.
Second, if jural sub-districts were relatively large as compared
with the size of actual distinct communities, jural districting would
fail to achieve consistent representation of particular communities to
the extent that residents of other communities within a sub-district
could represent that sub-district. If, for instance, particular commu-
nities were less frequently drawn from, then large sub-districts would
allow for more frequently-selected communities to overrepresent the
sub-district.
A third concern raised by importing electoral districting proce-
dures into the context of jury selection is the political struggles that
might arise over drawing jural district lines. As voting rights experts
are well aware, the process of drawing electoral district lines is hardly
163. See Colbert, supra note 32, at 126 (recounting horrific experience of woman who was
the only black person on a jury that acquitted a white police officer who fatally shot a ten year-
old black child); Victor Gold, Juror Competency to Testify that a Verdict Was the Product of
Racial Bias, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 125, 128 (1993) (referring to case in which "eleven
white jurors racially intimidated a lone black juror").
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ministerial. The complex and competing interests that are inevitably
affected by the location of district lines are often intensely fought over
in what the Supreme Court has aptly called the "political thicket" of
the districting process. 64 Add to this the increasingly frequent litiga-
tion over electoral districting plans as the Court attempts to subject
such plans to justiciable standards, and it becomes apparent why ju-
ral districting may create pains worse than those it is intended to
cure.
Finally, some jurisdictions, while interested in jural district-
ing, may not want to take account of race in drawing district lines.
The jurisdictions may decline to include race out of a sense of caution
against equal protection challenges or because the use of race may be
too politically divisive.
A variety of modifications could be made to jural districting to
address these concerns while retaining the central insight of jural dis-
tricting-the creation of jury diversity through geographic diversity.
Before considering such modifications, however, a strong word of cau-
tion is in order. Some modifications to the strict model of jural dis-
tricting could cause a loss in effectiveness that outweighs the cost-sav-
ing benefits that such modifications might afford. Indeed, a high
monetary cost of jural districting may actually indicate a strong need
for a more representative jury system which jural districting would
help to achieve. A city that would have significant difficulty in re-
cruiting jurors from particular sub-districts is probably a city in
which, at present, communities residing in those sub-districts are se-
verely underrepresented in the jury system. Similarly, particularly
divisive disputes over either district-line drawing or the conscious use
of race may reflect a city with intense inter-community tensions for
which a more representative criminal trial process may be particu-
larly salutary. Furthermore, any relaxation of a strict one-juror-per-
sub-district rule could undermine the inhibiting effect such a rule
might have on the use of racially-motivated peremptory challenges, a
practice that persists despite costly efforts to abolish it. Thus, the
modifications described below should be considered in light of the po-
tential loss of the benefits that a strict model of jural districting would
offer.
Cost reductions could be accomplished through various modifi-
cations to the strict model of jural districting. Jury districts could be
divided into fewer sub-districts. For example, two jurors could be
164. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 751 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 633 (1982); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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drawn from each of six sub-districts. In addition, summoning jurors
from each sub-district could be limited to the creation of the venire,
rather than the jury panel, thereby creating a more diverse venire
than at-large summoning processes create. Limiting districting to the
venire stage might also reduce the risk that jurors would perceive
their role on the petit jury as one of representing their sub-district
since, by not guaranteeing that any sub-district will be represented on
any given jury, the procedure itself would deny that representing any
specific sub-district is necessary for a fair trial. Moreover, limiting
districting to the venire would make any reference to a juror's sub-
district unnecessary during the selection of a jury for trial, thereby
minimizing the risk that jurors would be made aware or reminded of
the fact that they were selected from a particular sub-district.
Moreover, by focusing on the venire only, a greater number of sub-
districts, with fewer residents, could be designed, thereby enhancing
the ability to district around small, discrete communities. 165 To avoid
line-drawing burdens and disputes, pre-existing districts, such as
precincts or wards, could be used. If the number of jurors desired
would exceed the number of existing districts, the remaining jurors
could be selected "at-large."
In the event that court administrators considering jural dis-
tricting were concerned that the use of race would not be tolerated by
the courts or the public, the procedure could be modified accordingly.
Instead, communities of interest could be identified by demographic
characteristics other than race, such as political subdivision, class, re-
ligion, occupation, etc. The representation of these communities
would still enhance the diversity of experiences brought to the jury
room. Moreover, to the extent that race strongly correlates with
neighborhoods defined by other traits, such as economic class,
districting without regard to race would incidentally promote better
racial representation. Consider also that in areas where race would
likely not strongly correlate with other indicia of community, so that
color-blind districting would not enhance racial representativeness,
race might not, in such areas, serve as a particularly useful proxy for
a difference in experience or perspectives anyhow.166
165. See FUKURAI ET AL., supra note 11, at 165-90 (examining cluster-sampling method by
which venirepersons are selected from different census tracts).
166. The question whether color-blind districting would impair the state's ability to identify
communities of actual shared interest raises the question whether race has any independent
significance in determining juror (or voter) perceptions or whether race, in the end, is nothing
more than a proxy for other factors that in turn affect juror viewpoints. That is, if a community
of interest must share more than race in common, such as compactness, contiguity, political
subdivision, economic class, occupation, religion and/or political affiliation, the question arises
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As previously cautioned, any modifications to the strict jural
districting model would diminish its effectiveness in creating consis-
tently representative juries. At the same time, any amount of dis-
tricting would tend to enhance representativeness over current at-
large schemes. The trade-off is between effectiveness and cost. The
exact contours of any districting plan would depend on the particular
concerns and resources of the implementing jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
Both the function and the legitimacy of legislatures and juries
depend on the extent to which each institution represents a diversity
of groups within their respective jurisdictions. Equal protection con-
cerns, however, limit the extent to which the membership of eitjer
body can be manipulated to represent minority groups, particularly
racial or ethnic minorities. In cases examining the electoral process,
the Supreme Court has developed a concept of group identity that
satisfies equal protection concerns. Although repudiating the
assumption that race serves as a proxy for political interests above
other demographic characteristics, the Court is prepared to posit the
existence of "communities of interest," groups defined by residential
location in combination with other demographic factors-including
race-that suggest a commonality of interest. Electoral districting,
designed to include communities of interest within particular
districts, enhances the representative character of legislatures as
compared with at-large electoral schemes.
Applying districting principles to the selection of juries should
likewise enhance the extent to which juries consistently represent
various groups within the community. In areas where residential
segregation persists, jural districting would achieve a certain degree
of racial representation. Moving beyond the linear conception of di-
versity as limited to racial composition, jural districting could also fa-
cilitate the creation of juries that better represent a broad range of
groups residing in the surrounding area. By enhancing the represen-
tative character of the jury, jural districting offers to improve the
quality of the jury's decision-making function and to enhance its
legitimacy in the eyes of the litigants and the public. By drawing on
electoral districting doctrine, moreover, jural districting would avoid
whether race contributes anything to the actual character of the community, or even to the
evidence of the community's existence.
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many of the constitutional difficulties facing other race-conscious af-
firmative selection proposals.
The jury can represent the democratic ideals of an increasingly
inclusive society, or be an arbitrary and discriminatory tool of a ty-
rannical majority. The difference depends on whom the jury repre-
sents. When the public believes that juries frequently represent only
particular groups, it justifiably doubts the legitimacy of the jury and
its decisions. Through jural districting, of one form or another, the
representativeness and legitimacy of the jury can be restored in some
degree.
